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God Is My Roommate? Tax Exemptions for Parsonages
Yesterday, Today, and (if Constitutional) Tomorrow
SAMUEL D. BRUNSON*

In 2019, the Seventh Circuitdecided an Establishment Clause question that had
been percolatingthrough the courtsfor two decades. It held that the parsonage
allowance, which permits "ministers of the gospel" to receive an untaxed housing
allowance, does not violate the EstablishmentClause ofthe Constitution.It grounded
its conclusion in part on the "historical significance" test the Supreme Court
establishedin its Town of Greece v. Galloway decision.
In coming to that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit cited a 200-year unbroken
history ofproperty tax exemptions for religious property. According to the Seventh
Circuit, that history demonstrated that both the Founders and subsequent
generations ofAmericans recognized that there was no constitutionalproblem with
exempting parsonages.

The

court's historical significance analysis wasfundamentally flawed,

however. Had the court actually engaged with this history, rather than made the
conclusoryassertion ofconsistent and uncontroversialexemption, it would have seen

at least two things that complicated its facile conclusion. Significantly, in treating
the history ofreligiousproperty tax exemptions as unbroken and consistent, the court
elided the actual history, which was messy and varied. The actual history provides
no support for the proposition that the Framers and those who followed viewed
property tax exemptions as constitutional.
Even if the history were as clean as the Seventh Circuit portrayed it, that
history would have been irrelevant to the question of the constitutionality of the
parsonage allowance. The Supreme Court did not incorporate the Establishment
Clause against the states until 1947, so statesfaced no Establishment Clause bar
to exemptingfor religious property. And the federal government only made four
attempts at taxing property, none of which expressly exempted religious property.
In this Article, I explore the historicaland current tax exemptionsfor parsonages,
and trace how states arrivedat their current exemptions. Ultimately, I conclude that
the historical significance test, as applied by the Seventh Circuit, does not support
the constitutionalityof the parsonage allowance. I further conclude that, given its
complexity and the fact that attorneys and judges tend to be poor historians, the

historical significance test is not well suited as a jurisprudentialtool for analyzing
Establishment Clause questions, and that courts should not adopt it.

* Georgia Reithal Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I would
like to thank Ellen P. Aprill, Brian D. Galle, Adam Chodorow, Frederick M. Gedicks, James
Hagy, David J. Herzig, and Jeffrey L. Kwall for their helpful comments. I would like to thank
the Loyola University Chicago School of Law for its generous research stipend. I would also
like to thank Jamie Brunson for her support.
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INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Presbyterian Church in Chicago bought a $975,000 condominium for
its head pastor in 2018.1 While expensive, that parsonage 2 provides both the church
and the pastor with substantial benefits. With employer-provided housing, the pastor
does not need to pay for housing, and can instead spend her salary on other things,
including food, housing, and even recreation. Meanwhile, the church can pay its
pastor a lower salary because the pastor incurs lower expenses. In fact, as the Fourth
Presbyterian Church considered acquiring the parsonage, its senior pastor agreed to
a reduction in her cash compensation. 3

1. Bob Goldsborough, Fourth Presbyterian Church Pays $975, 000 for Gold Coast
Condo, CHIC. TRIB., (Aug. 1, 2018, 8:20 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/real-estate
/elite-street/ct-re-elite-street-fourth-presbyterian-church-20 180731-story.html [https://perma
.cc/ZRL7-HXZK].
2. Broadly speaking, a "parsonage" is "the residence of any minister of religion."
Parsonage,OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005). Because section 107 of the Internal
Revenue Code is titled "Rental value of parsonages," however, I will use "parsonage" more
broadly, meaning any housing provided to clergy. I.R. C. § 107 (2018). While section 107 only
excludes housing provided to a "minister of the gospel," the IRS reads "minister of the gospel"
to include non-Christians whose duties "constitute the conduct of religious worship or the
ministration of sacerdotal functions." Rev. Rul. 58-221, 1958-1 C.B. 53.
3. Senior PastorHousing Proposal:Synopsis, FOURTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (Apr. 12,
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This parsonage also provides the church and the pastor with less-obvious tax
benefits. For instance, as long as the Fourth Presbyterian Church requires its head
pastor to live in the parsonage as a condition of her employment, it will not have to
pay Illinois property tax on the parsonage. And while employer-provided housing
represents a benefit to an employee, clergy do not have to include the value of
church-provided parsonages in their gross income for income tax purposes. The
value of the parsonage to the pastor is higher than the after-tax amount other
taxpayers would spend on similar housing.
While the Fourth Presbyterian Church has the resources to acquire a parsonage
for its head pastor,4 those resources are unnecessary for clergy to receive the benefit
of a federal income tax exemption for housing. Congress also allows clergy to receive
a tax-free cash housing allowance, a benefit unavailable to nonclergy taxpayers
These exclusions do not represent a policy of absolutely ignoring clergy housing for
tax purposes: clergy have to include the value of church-provided housing and
housing allowances in calculating their self-employment tax. 5
The tax law treats (some) religious employees better than it treats nonreligious
employees. This better treatment at least implicates the Establishment Clause.6 The
Freedom From Religion Foundation noticed this implication, and twice filed suit,
arguing that the parsonage allowance violated the Establishment Clause, culminating
in the Seventh Circuit's decision in Gaylor v. Mnuchin.'
The court faced a significant obstacle in adjudicating this case, though: the state
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence "is a mess-both hopelessly confused and
deeply contradictory." 8 In spite of the chaotic state of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the Seventh Circuit had to resolve the question of whether the
parsonage allowance violated the Constitution. To do so, it independently applied
and the 'historical
two tests: "the test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman ...
significance' test of Town of Greece v. Galloway."9
Although the Gaylor court uses two tests to bolster its holding, this Article will
focus on the historical significance test adopted by the court. I focus solely on the
historical significance test precisely because, unlike the Lemon test, it is new and has
not been fleshed out. The Seventh Circuit's use of the test demonstrates both flaws

2018),
https://www.fourthchurch.org/news/senior-pastor-housing-synopsis.html
[https://perma.cc/SX7C-BJDU].
4. Because the Fourth Presbyterian Church has not posted its 2018 financial statements
online, the public cannot know the value of its assets. It has disclosed its 2018 revenue though:
in 2018 it brought in $8,220,652. FOURTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, 2018 IMPACT REPORT,

https://www.fourthchurch.org/giving/impact-20 18.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z98F-PSY4].
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-11(a) (2015).
6. See Christopher L. Eisgmber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
RestorationAct is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 448 (1994) ("[T]he idea of a broad
privilege for religiously motivated conduct baldly contradicts the best understanding of the
foundations of religious freedom.").
7. 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1084 (W.D. Wis. 2017), rev'd, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019)
("This is the second time that the foundation and its officers have challenged § 107(2)."). For
a discussion of the Freedom From Religion Foundation's suits, see infra Section IIB.
8. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court'sFour EstablishmentClauses, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006).

9. Gaylor, 919 F.3d 420, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2019).
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in the test and significant difficulties courts can face in both choosing the appropriate
history to explore and in actually evaluating that history.
I will demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit's application of the historical
significance test was deeply flawed and ahistorical. The Seventh Circuit
misrepresented the substantive history of the property tax exemption for parsonages.
Even if it accurately portrayed the history, though, it chose the wrong history to focus
on: property tax exemptions are not equivalent to income tax exemptions, either as a
matter of law or as a matter of constitutional analysis.
In its Gaylor decision, the Seventh Circuit explains that questions of
establishment must "acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and
has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change." 10 Under this test, if
the practice existed at the time the First Amendment was enacted and has continued
to be accepted, a court should hesitate to find it unconstitutional. For questions of
income tax, applying this test is incoherent, given that the income tax did not exist at
the time of the Framers,11 and that the provision being challenged-the exclusion of
cash housing allowances-was not enacted until 1954.12
Instead of analyzing the history of the parsonage allowance, the Gaylor court
looked at "a lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for churchowned properties." 13 Using the property tax to analyze an income tax provision is
problematic for a number of reasons," but even on its own terms, the Seventh
Circuit's review of the history is both facile and inaccurate. Instead of engaging the
relevant long and complex history, the Seventh Circuit provides a cursory summary
in a single page of its opinion. In this Article, I will discuss both the federal parsonage
allowance and state property tax exemptions for parsonages. In that discussion, I will
highlight the shortcomings of the Seventh Circuit's use of the historical significance
test, which reads the history in a motivated and instrumental manner to arrive at the
conclusion it wants.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I discuss the parsonage allowance. I
describe why and how Congress enacted it. Then, in Part II, I talk about two
constitutional challenges that the parsonage allowance faced. Through legislation,
Congress managed to protect the parsonage allowance from the first Establishment

10. Id. at 436 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014)).
11. The modern income tax can trace its roots back to the British income tax of 1799.
PETER HARRIS, INCOME TAX IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1820 1

(2006). The United States enacted its first income tax during the Civil War, STEVEN A. BANK,
KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 39 (Kathleen Courrier et al. eds.,
2008), but that tax expired in 1871. Samuel D. Brunson, Mormon Profit: Brigham Young,

Tithing, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 2019 BYU L. REV. 41, 104 (2019). Congress
made an abortive attempt to enact a federal income tax in 1894, David J. Herzig & Samuel D.
Brunson, Let Prophets Be (Non) Profits, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1122 (2017), and
finally enacted the modern federal income tax in 1913. BANK ET AL., supra, at 11.
12. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
13. Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 436.

14. Among other things, the two are significantly different economically. "A major
difference between a property tax and an income tax is that the latter taxes human capital (or
at least returns there from) whereas the former does not (at least not directly)." HARRIS, supra
note 11, at 386.
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Clause challenge, while, in the second, the Seventh Circuit ultimately held that the
parsonage allowance was consistent with the Lemon test and that it met the Supreme
Court's historical significance test.
Part III begins to engage with the historical significance test on a broad level.
Rather than focus on parsonages, Part III looks at the history of religious property
tax exemptions at the time of the Framers through the nineteenth century. The Part
points out that the Establishment Clause is largely irrelevant to property tax
exemptions for religious property. Notably, as the Establishment Clause was not
incorporated against the states until 1947, this treatment is largely irrelevant to both
the question of parsonage exemptions and to questions of religious property tax
exemptions broadly.1 5 Nonetheless, because the Seventh Circuit fails to note any of
this history, the Part will review these histories.
Part IV provides a comprehensive look at how states treat parsonages for purposes
of their property tax both today and in the past. Currently, some states explicitly
exempt parsonages, some include parsonages as a subset of exempt religious
property, and some states do not exempt parsonages. Moreover, a number of states
that currently exempt parsonages did not exempt them in the nineteenth or early
twentieth centuries. Part IV analyzes the states that have changed their exemption.
All of this discussion will demonstrate that the history of property tax exemptions
for parsonages is neither clean nor consistent and lends no support to the
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance. Part V takes the analysis a step further,
explaining why, even if the history was clean and consistent, it is irrelevant to the
question of whether the parsonage allowance comports with the Establishment
Clause.
Part V then explains that even if this history did support the proposition that
property tax exemptions for parsonages met the historical significance test, that lends
no support to the parsonage allowance's constitutionality. By looking at the property
tax, the court chose an inapposite comparison. The differences between property tax
exemptions and income tax exclusions differ in a constitutionally relevant manner.
Finally, the Conclusion will evaluate what this history means, not only for the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Gaylor, but also for the utility of the historical
significance test. Ultimately, I conclude that the Gaylor opinion's application of the
historical significance is a master class in misreading and misusing history. And that
master class has significance beyond merely the analysis of the constitutionality of
the parsonage allowance. It illustrates the difficulty in honestly evaluating a
complicated history, and the pitfalls that attorneys and courts trying to do so face.
I. THE PARSONAGE ALLOWANCE
In 1913, Congress enacted the modern federal income tax.16 This new tax applied
to taxpayers' "entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding

15. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.

16.
(2013).

JOSEPH

J.

THORNDIKE, THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF

FDR

5
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calendar year to every citizen of the United States." 17 The law defined "income"
broadly, including any compensation for services "in whatever form paid." 18
While this definition of income could potentially encompass virtually any type of
transfer of value from an employer to an employee, Congress was not explicit about
what had to be treated as income. For instance, the Revenue Act of 1913 did not
explicitly mention employer-provided housing.19 The Treasury Department broadly
believed that, in the abstract, such housing constituted a form of compensation and
was thus subject to taxation. 2 Still, within the first decade of the income tax, the
Treasury Department began to cabin the reach of this broad rule.
In 1919, the Treasury Department announced that "[b]oard and lodging furnished
seamen in addition to their cash compensation is held to be supplied for the
convenience of the employer and the value thereof is not required to be reported in
such employees' income tax returns." 2 1 It proceeded to formalize this test in
regulations, providing that where an employer provided housing to its employees
"for the convenience of the employer" rather than for compensatory purposes,
employees could exclude the value of housing from their taxable income. 22
Almost immediately after issuing the regulation, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
began to provide examples of housing that met the "convenience of the employer"
test.23 For instance, employees engaged in fishing and cannery work could receive
tax-free housing where such housing was "necessary" as a result of the "location and
nature" of their work.24 Similarly, where hospital employees were "subject to
immediate service on demand at any time," and were thus required to accept housing
from the hospital, they could exclude the value of that housing from their gross
income.25 Employees of the Indian Service could also exempt employer-provided
26
housing where the housing was provided for the convenience of the employer.
While the Bureau's rulings did not represent an exclusive list of professions that
qualified for the convenience-of-the-employer exception, it did provide that certain
professions never qualified for tax-free housing under the convenience-of-theemployer test. In 1921, Treasury determined that clergy was one of these disqualified

17. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166.
18. Id. § II(B) at 167.
19. Adam Chodorow, The ParsonageExemption, 51 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 849, 856 (2018).

20. See T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76 ("[W]here a person receives as compensation for
services rendered a salary and in addition thereto living quarters, the value to such person of
the quarters furnished constitutes income subject to tax.").
21. O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71.
22. T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76.
23.

SAMUEL D. BRUNSON, GOD AND THE IRS: ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN

80 (2018).
24. O.D. 814, 1921-4 C.B. 84-85.
25. O.D. 915, 1921-4 C.B. 84-85.
26. O.D. 914, 1921-4 C.B. 85. Interestingly, for Indian Service employees, the
convenience-of-the-employer test turned on whether the housing was "charged to the
appropriation from which the compensation of such employees is paid," in which case they
had to include it in their income. Id. On the other hand, if they were permitted to stay there
"without making the right to use such quarters a part of the compensation of such employees,"
they did not. Id.
UNITED STATES TAX LAW
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professions. 27 According to the Bureau ruling, if, in addition to receiving a salary,
clergy "is permitted to use the parsonage for living quarters free of charge," they had
to include the fair rental value of the parsonage in income. 28
That same year, Congress overruled the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 29 Congress
did not merely enact a legislative mandate that parsonages fell within the Treasurycreated convenience-of-the-employer test. Rather, it created a new statutory category
of exemption, allowing clergy to exclude "[t]he rental value of a dwelling house and
appurtenances thereof furnished to a minister of the gospel as part of his
compensation." 30 For clergy, Congress had introduced a brand-new exemption that
allowed them to exclude housing provided for expressly compensatory purposes.
Within two years, the Bureau received questions about the scope of the exclusion:
Did it also exclude housing allowances paid to clergy in place of parsonages?3 1 The
Bureau replied that the exclusion applied only to the in-kind provision of housing;
clergy had to include a housing allowance in gross income "as additional
compensation for services rendered." 3 2 In spite of the plain language of the parsonage
allowance, a number of courts disagreed with the Bureau, holding that the parsonage
allowance allowed clergy to exclude cash housing allowances from gross income. 33
The Eighth Circuit justified its conclusion, not based on the text of the statute, but
based on its conviction that "it was not the intent nor purpose of Congress that a
house allowance in lieu of the rental value of a dwelling house and appurtenances
thereof furnished to a minister of the gospel should be included in his gross
income." 3 4
In 1954, Congress stepped into this debate and sided with the judiciary. Congress
added a provision to the tax law expressly excluding "the rental allowance paid to [a
minister of the gospel] as part of his compensation to the extent used by him to rent
or provide a home" from gross income. 3 5 Representative Peter Mack, Jr., who
introduced the provision, explained that a Baptist organization had alerted him to the
tax disparity between clergy who received in-kind housing and clergy who did not,
36
a disparity that he considered discriminatory.

BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 80.
28. O.D. 862, 1921-4 C.B. 85. Clergy were not the only profession barred from excluding
housing under the convenience-of-the-employer test: Army officers could not exclude in-kind
housing or cash housing allowances from their gross income. O.D. 921, 1921-4 C.B. 86.
29. Chodorow, supra note 19, at 857.
30. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239 (1921).
31. I.T. 1694, II-1 C.B. 79 (1923).
27.

32. Id.

33. BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 81.
34. Williamson v. Comm'r, 224 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1955).
35. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 107(2), 68A Stat. 1, 32.
36. BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 81. While Representative Mack stated that his primary
goal was to end interdenominational discrimination, he also believed that benefiting clergy,
who were "carrying on such a courageous fight" against a "godless and antireligious world
movement," was "not too much to do for these people who are caring for our spiritual welfare."
GeneralRevenue Revision: Hearingson Forty Topics Pertainingto the GeneralRevisions of
the Internal Revenue Code Before the H Comm. On Ways & Means, 83d Cong. 1574-76

(1953) (statement of Rep. Peter F. Mack, Jr.).
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At the same time as it expanded the parsonage allowance, Congress codified the
Treasury Department's convenience-of-the-employer test.37 Unlike the parsonage
allowance, though, Congress provided no expansion in scope for this income
exclusion. For an employee to exclude employer-provided housing from gross
income, the employer had to provide in-kind housing, the housing had to be located
on the business premises of and provided for the convenience of the employer, and
the employee had to be required to accept the housing as a condition of her
employment. 38
II. CONTROVERSY OVER THE PARSONAGE ALLOWANCE
Until recently, the parsonage allowance has faced only a limited amount of
constitutional controversy. Almost two decades after the expansion of the exclusion
to ministers' cash housing allowances, Professor David C. Johnson first noted that,
even "[i]gnoring the constitutional problem" with the parsonage allowance, it
seemed unfair.39 The next year, a comment in the Georgetown Law Journal not only
argued that the parsonage allowance was unfair, but expressly argued that it violated
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.4
Since then, the pushback against the parsonage allowance has steadily grown.
This pushback has not been limited solely to academics. For example, in 1984, to
fulfill his promise to simplify the tax law, President Ronald Reagan "asked the
Treasury Department to devise a tax reform plan."4 1 As part of its plan, the Treasury
Department proposed eliminating the parsonage allowance. 4 2 It explained that the
parsonage allowance violated tax policy by allowing ministers to pay less in taxes,
while putting upward pressure on marginal tax rates.4 3 Moreover, it was unnecessary:
although clergy salaries were low compared to other professions, they were not low
"compared to taxpayers in general."4 4 And the exclusion disproportionately
benefitted wealthy clergy. 4 5
Still, academics have continued to contest the propriety of the parsonage
allowance. While it would be beyond the scope of this Article to review all of the

37. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 119, 68A Stat. 1, 39 (1954).
38. Id.
39. David C. Johnson, Provisions of the Tax Policy Review Bill of 1972 Affecting
Individual Taxpayers, 49 N.D. L. REv. 439, 482 (1973). The unfairness Professor Johnson
pointed out was that ministers were not in the only profession that was undercompensated. Id.
The justification for subsidizing their homes would have to rest on some other grounds.
40.

Roger H. Taft, Tax Benefits for the Clergy: The Unconstitutionality of Section 107,

62 GEo. L.J. 1261, 1271 (1974).
41. Matthew W. Foster, Note, The Parsonage Allowance Exclusion: Past, Present, and
Future, 44 VAND. L. REv. 149, 162 (1991).
42. OFF. OF THE SEC'Y DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT Overview 73

(1984).
43. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT vol. 2

49 (1984).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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academic literature, I will summarize some of the commentary. In the early 1990s,
Professor Joel Newman explained that "[s]ection 107 [the Code section excluding
parsonages from income] has never made any sense. Legislative history is sparse and
suggests only that Congress thought that ministers deserved a tax break." 4 6 He
highlighted two problems with it. The first was its questionable constitutionality. 4 7
The second was its general unfairness. At religious universities, he explained, some
faculty who fell outside of the scope of intended beneficiaries-including "members
of the education and chemistry departments, as well as members of the religion
department"-could qualify for tax-free parsonage allowances.4 8
In the early 2000s, Professor Edward Zelinksy complicated the analysis. Under
the Supreme Court's Texas Monthly49 precedent, he said, the parsonage allowance
would be unconstitutional "on the ground that section 107 narrowly subsidizes
religion." 50 Under its Walz" precedent, on the other hand, Professor Zelinksy
believed that the parsonage allowance would be "constitutional as a permissible
recognition of sectarian autonomy."5 While he recognized the conflict and the
argument that the parsonage allowance was unconstitutional, Professor Zelinksy
ultimately thought that the Walz precedent-which would uphold the parsonage
allowance-provided the better constitutional analysis.5 3 Still, although he believed
that Walz provided the better analysis, he acknowledged that Texas Monthly was, at
the time, the Supreme Court's last word on the question of subsidizing religion. 54
A decade later, Professor Zelinsky continued to argue that the Establishment
Clause permitted the government to exempt housing allowances paid to clergy from
the tax base. 55 By then, he had refined his argument to focus on avoiding
entanglement between the state and religion. 56 But, he argued, even if the parsonage
allowance was permissible (though not mandatory), it represented poor tax policy:

46.

NOTEs
47.
48.
49.
50.

Joel S. Newman, On Section 107's Worst Feature: The Teacher-Preacher,61 TAx

1505, 1507 (1993).
Id. ("[T]he constitutionality of the section is not entirely clear.").
Id.
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
Edward A. Zelinksy, Dr. Warren, the ParsonageExclusion, andthe FirstAmendment,

95 TAx NOTES 115, 118 (2002).
51. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
52. Zelinksy, supranote 50, at 118.
53. Id. at 120.
54. Id. Subsequent to his article, Congress made some minor changes to prevent the Ninth
Circuit from ruling on the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance. See infra text
accompanying notes 78-80. After those changes, Professor Zelinsky acknowledged that "the
recent amendment of section 107(2), while intended to bolster that provision, in my judgment
weakens both the constitutional and the tax policy arguments for that section by enmeshing
the clergy and the IRS for future years in potentially contentious controversies about the rental
values of the homes of taxpayer/clergymen." Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, Section 107,
and Texas Monthly: A Reply, 95 TAx NOTEs 1663, 1669 n.54 (2002).
55. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the
EstablishmentClause? The Constitutionalityof the ParsonageAllowance Exclusion and the
Religious Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and SelfEmployment Taxes, 33 CARDOZOL. REv. 101, 144 (2012).

56. Id.
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"In terms of tax policy, there is no persuasive case for Section 107(2) and its
exclusion of cash parsonage allowances." 5 7
Around the same time, Professor Ellen Aprill suggested that the parsonage
allowance be both expanded and narrowed so that it apply not to "ministers of the
gospel," but to certain employees of all nonprofits who needed to be available for
emergency calls. 58 Doing so would avoid any potential Establishment Clause
problem because clergy would make up a portion of a larger group that benefited
rather than being the sole recipients of the benefit.59
More recently, in the course of the Seventh Circuit litigation, the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty argued that a tax-free housing allowance paid to clergy did not
violate the Establishment Clause because it sent "a message of neutrality with respect
to religion, not endorsement." 60 Becket asserted that the parsonage allowance was
merely the extension of a series of expansions to the convenience-of-the-employer

test.61
Professor Adam Chodorow responded to Becket's assertion, arguing that the
parsonage allowance raised significant Establishment Clause concerns because it
"singles out religious actors for a special tax benefit .... "62 While he acknowledged
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence was "muddled," he argued, contrary to
Professor Zelinsky, that the parsonage allowance did not fit within a broad, neutral
policy that included clergy. 63 As a result, he said, Walz was inapplicable, and courts
should find the parsonage allowance unconstitutional under Texas Monthly.64
Despite the pushback against the parsonage allowance, no taxpayer challenged its
constitutionality in court until the early 2000s. The author of the Georgetown Law
Journal Comment argued that this failure to raise a constitutional challenge "can be
credited in part to the fact that before the 1968 Supreme Court decision in Flast v.
Cohen, a federal taxpayer qua taxpayer had no standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal statute." 65 Even with this taxpayer standing, though,

57. Id. at 133.
58. Ellen Aprill, Parsonageand Tax Policy: Rethinking the Exclusion, 38 EXEMPT ORG.
TAx REV. 29, 31 (2002).
59. Id.
60. Brief of Intervening Defendants-Appellants at 53, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420,
425 (7th Cir. 2019).
61. Id.
62. Adam Chodorow, The ParsonageExemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 909 (2018).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Taft, supra note 40, at 1271. In 1923, the Supreme Court held that an individual's
status as a taxpayer, by itself, did not confer standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). Forty-five years later,
the Court acknowledged that its holding had functioned as "an impenetrable barrier to suits
against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert only the interest of federal
taxpayers. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968). The Court thus announced a new test under
which an individual "sometimes has standing to challenge legislation solely as a result of her
status as a taxpayer." Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning
Prohibition.Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REv. 143, 162 (2016).
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taxpayers have a hard time challenging the constitutionality of a tax provision. The
pathway to challenge a tax law is remarkably narrow.66
Still, the author of the Comment predicted that the new standard enunciated in
Flast would open the door for a constitutional challenge to the parsonage
allowance. 67 That predicted challenge materialized in 2002.68
A. Challenge Number One: Rick Warren and Erwin Chemerinsky
The first constitutional challenge to the parsonage allowance arose accidentally,
the unintended consequence of a standard audit. The controversy started in the 1990s,
when the IRS disallowed a portion of the Warrens' parsonage allowance exclusion. 69
Richard Warren had founded the Saddleback Valley Community Church in 1980.70
In 1992, the Warrens bought a house for $360,000.71 Between 1992 and 1995, the
trustees of the church began to designate the full amount of Richard Warren's
compensation as a housing allowance, which he could exclude from his gross
income.1 2 In 1996, they designated $80,000 of his $100,000 salary as a housing
allowance.1 3
The Warrens excluded from their gross income the amounts they spent on
"mortgage, utilities, furnishings, landscaping, repairs, and maintenance and real
property taxes and homeowner's insurance premiums," which were less than the
amount designated as a housing allowance.7 4 It was more, however, than the fair
rental value of their home, and the IRS argued that the exclusion should be limited
to the lesser of the amount spent on housing or the fair rental value of a minister's
home.75
The Tax Court disagreed.7 6 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit appointed Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky to address whether the court had authority to review the
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance, whether it should do so, and whether
the allowance was constitutional."?
Before the court could review the questions it had asked, though, Congress passed
Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002.78 Representative Ramstad,
who introduced the legislation, explained that his legislation was meant to "stop the
attack on the housing allowance by resolving the underlying issue in the tax court

66. SAMUEL D. BRUNSON, GOD AND THE IRS: ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IN
UNITED STATES TAx LAW 93 (2018).
67. Taft, supra note 40, at 1271.
68. Warren v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
69. Warren v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 343, 344 (2000).
70. Id.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 351.
Warren v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 1119, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2002).
Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat. 583 (2002).
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case." 7 9 After all, he explained, the Ninth Circuit had "hijacked the case and turned
it into a challenge of the very constitutionality of the housing allowance" with the
aid of "a law professor who happened to believe that it was unconstitutional." 0
Congress's gambit worked. The law provided that, prior to 2002, clergy could
exclude housing allowance of up to their full housing expenses.8 1 Going forward,
though, the clergy could only exclude up to the fair rental value of their property. 82
Effectively, it allowed the Warrens to win their litigation, but adopted the IRS's
position for future years. 83 Satisfied, the parties to the litigation filed a motion to
dismiss, which the Ninth Circuit granted.84 At the same time, it denied Professor
Chemerinsky's motion to intervene.8 5 This initial constitutional challenge to the
parsonage allowance had effectively died.
B. ChallengeNumber Two: Freedom From Religion Foundation
About a decade later, the Freedom From Religion Foundation took up Professor
Chemerinsky's mantle. The Freedom From Religion Foundation often functions as
an Establishment Clause watchdog, "conducting court challenges of violations of the
separation between church and state." 8 6 On September 13, 2011, The Freedom From
Religion Foundation filed a complaint in which it asserted "that 26 U.S.C. §107, both
on its face and as administered by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and the
Department of the Treasury ("Treasury"), violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by providing preferential
tax benefits to ministers of the gospel." 87 In its complaint, Freedom From Religion
Foundation argued that the parsonage allowance violated the Establishment Clause
in three respects: first, it was intended to (and did) subsidize religion. 88 Second, it
discriminated against people who were not clergy. 89 Third, its administration
required excessive entanglement between state and church. 90
While Freedom From Religion Foundation originally challenged the
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance's exclusion of both in-kind housing and
housing allowances, the district court dismissed the challenge to the exclusion of inkind housing on standing grounds. 91 But the court held, using a "modified version of

79. 148 CONG. REc. H1300 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002).
80. Id. at H1299.
81. Erwin Chemerinsky, The ParsonageExemption Violates the Establishment Clause
and Should Be Declared Unconstitutional,24 WHITTIER L. REv. 707, 708 (2003).

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Warren v. Comm'r, 302 F.3d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
86. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., GettingAcquainted, https://ffrf.org/about/getting
-acquainted [https://perma.cc/P49Z-7EPF].
87. Complaint at 1, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051
(W.D. Wis. 2013), vacated and remanded, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 3:11-cv-00626).
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1053 (W.D. Wis.
2013), vacated and remanded, 773 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Because plaintiffs have not
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the Lemon test," 92 that permitting clergy, and only clergy, to exclude cash housing
allowances from their gross income violated the Constitution. 93
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court decision and remanded
it to be dismissed for lack of standing.94 The court never addressed the merits of the
case, instead finding that the plaintiffs in the case lacked standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the parsonage allowance because they had never attempted to
claim it, and had thus never had their claim denied.9 5 The fact that others receive an
allegedly unconstitutional benefit did not, of itself, create a "judicially cognizable

injury."

96

In a footnote, though, the Seventh Circuit provided the Freedom From Religion
Foundation with a path forward: "to establish standing, a plaintiff must request (and
be denied) a benefit, even if, practically speaking, the request has no chance of
success." 97 The plaintiffs followed the court's advice, and the Freedom From
Religion Foundation designated a portion of the salary it paid to Gaylor and Barker
as a housing allowance, which they included in income. 98 In 2015, they filed an
amended return for 2013 claiming the parsonage allowance. 99
And the IRS provided them with a refund. 0 So two months after filing their
amended 2013 returns, they filed an amended return for 2012, again claiming the
parsonage allowance. 1 This time, to ensure that the IRS understood that they did
not qualify under the terms of the parsonage allowance, they pointed out on their
amended return that "they are 'not clergy' and that their 'employer is not a church,'

opposed defendants' argument that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 107(1), I will grant
defendants' motion as to that aspect of plaintiffs' claim.").
92. Id. at 1061.
93. Id. at 1073.
94. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 825 (7th Cir. 2014).
95. Id.
96. Id. The district court had elided the standing problem, finding "that plaintiffs' alleged
injury is clear from the face of the statute and that there is no plausible argument that the
individual plaintiffs could qualify for an exemption as 'ministers of the gospel,' so it would
serve no legitimate purpose to require plaintiffs to claim the exemption and wait for the
inevitable denial of the claim." Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew, 983 F. Supp. 2d
1051, 1055-56 (W.D. Wis. 2013). The Seventh Circuit explained that even if requiring the
plaintiffs to claim the parsonage allowance and have their claim rejected would not improve
the courts' ability to adjudicate the constitutional question, it was nonetheless a constitutional
requirement that they take those steps. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 773 F.3d at 82425.
97. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 773 F.3d at 824 n.6.

98. Gaylorv. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 2017). To be excludable,
the housing allowance must be remuneration for "services which are ordinarily the duties of a
minister of the gospel." Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (as amended in 1963). In addition, the
employing church must designate the portion of compensation that represents a housing
allowance as such. Id. § 1.107-1(b). While they were not clergy, Gaylor and co-plaintiff Barker
were co-presidents of the Freedom From Religion Foundation. Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at
1085.
99. Gaylor, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 1085.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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but they believed 'it is unfair that ministers can exclude housing while we
cannot."1 2 This time, the IRS rejected their claim, and they again sued, arguing that
the parsonage allowance violated the Establishment Clause. 0 3 Again, the district
court held the parsonage allowance unconstitutional, 0 4 and again the government

appealed. 105
This time, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs had established an injuryin-fact and had standing to sue. 106 As such, the court had to address the substance of
the complaint, albeit against an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that was
"famously chaotic." 10 ' When questions of religious establishment come up, "the
Court cannot even settle on one standard to apply in all Establishment Clause

cases." 108
Recognizing that the chaotic mess of Establishment Clause jurisprudence offered
little guidance as to what standard to apply, the Seventh Circuit decided to evaluate
the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance using two standards: the Lemon test
and the "'historical significance' test of Town of Greece v. Galloway." 109 The
Seventh Circuit decided that, under either test, the parsonage allowance was not
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause, and upheld its constitutionality.110
The Gaylor court's analysis under the historical significance test failed to engage
the complicated history of tax exemptions for churches and parsonages. It looked
instead at an imagined history and engaged that imagined history only at a surface
level." To the extent that the historical significance test may become one of the
(many) Establishment Clause tests, the Seventh Circuit's opinion provides a poor
model for future opinions. Through the rest of this Article, I will proceed to
illuminate the complicated and inconsistent history of tax exemptions for churches
and parsonages. In doing so, I will describe the analysis in which a court should
engage if it wants to employ the historical significance test properly.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1104.
Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 426.
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the

Contraception Mandate: An UnconstitutionalAccommodation of Religion, 49 HARv. C.R.-

C.L. L. REv. 343, 348 (2014).
108. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four EstablishmentClauses, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 725 (2006).

109. Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 426-27.
110. Id. at 435-36 ("Section 107(2), then, does not violated the Establishment Clause under
the Lemon test. ... [Me conclude § 107(2) does not violate the Establishment Clause under
the historical significance test.").
111. The court's Lemon test analysis was also insufficient. While it acknowledged that both
the inquiry into the use of a minister's home and the inquiry into who qualified as a "minister
of the gospel" for purposes of the parsonage allowance implicated government entanglement
with religion, it ultimately chose to defer to Congress rather than establishing a framework for
deciding between two potential entanglements. Id. at 434-35. Evaluating such competing
entanglements under the Lemon test is beyond the scope of this article, though, and will have
to wait for a subsequent article.
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III. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE TEST

While the Seventh Circuit appears to have created the name,1 1 2 the Supreme Court
established the historical significance test in Town of Greece v. Galloway.113 In Town
of Greece, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether legislative prayer
violated the Establishment Clause." 4 In its analysis, the Court explained that "it is
not necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where
history shows that the specific practice is permitted. Any test the Court adopts must
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the
critical scrutiny of time and political change.""5
Adopting the historical significance test as a potential Establishment Clause test,
the Seventh Circuit looked at the long tradition of tax exemptions for religion. It
explained that "[fjor over two centuries, the states have implemented church property
tax exemptions in various forms." 116 It pointed out that constitutional challenges to
these property tax exemptions have been unsuccessful and that the federal
government enacted religious property tax exemptions as far back as 1802." The
court found the plaintiffs' objection that property taxes differ substantively from
income taxes "too fine a distinction," and ultimately decided that Congress "was
continuing its 'historical practice[]' of exempting certain church resources from
taxation."118 Thus, it held, allowing clergy to exclude housing allowances from their
gross income was consistent with a long history of constitutionally permissible tax
exemptions granted to churches.119
While the Seventh Circuit baldly asserted the history of church tax exemptions,
its opinion neither laid out that history nor analyzed it. Rather, the opinion cited

112. A Westlaw search for "historical significance test" in All Content brings thirteen hits.
The only case that includes "historical significance test" is the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Gaylor. Ten secondary sources include the phrase, and seven of those are discussing the
Gaylor case. (One of the other three also deals with a question of religion, while the other two
have no Establishment Clause relationship at all.) The search also comes up with two briefs,
both of which use it citing the Gaylor case.
113. 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
114. Id. at 569-70 ("The Court must decide whether the town of Greece, New York,
imposes an impermissible establishment of religion by opening its monthly board meetings
with a prayer.").

115. Id. at 577. After the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Gaylor, the Supreme Court issued
an opinion adopting a type of historical significance analysis. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist
Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2083 (2019). That case is not entirely consonant with the Seventh
Circuit's version of the test, however. The Seventh Circuit was analyzing the historical
significance of a law providing special treatment to religious individuals. The Supreme Court,
by contrast, was analyzing the historical significance of "an established monument, symbol,
or practice." Id. at 2082. Although the Seventh Circuit dismissed Gaylor's argument that the
historical significance test applied only to legislative prayer, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d
420, 435 n. 11 (7th Cir. 2019), the Supreme Court's subsequent application of the historical
significance test does little to suggest it envisions the test as broad enough to capture tax laws.
116. Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 436.

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Professor John Witte, Jr. in asserting that states have granted religious tax
exemptions in various forms over the last two centuries. 12 0 However, the court
appears not to have read the article it so approvingly cited, because it failed to notice
that the article criticized precisely this surface-level narrative of two centuries of
consistent and uncontroversial property tax exemptions for religious property. In
evaluating the Supreme Court's conclusion in Walz that, among other things, 200
years of states sanctioning religious tax exemptions supported their constitutionality,
Professor Witte argued that "[w]hile the Court's conclusion on so tender and
tempestuous an issue may have been inevitable, its arguments are not ineluctable." 12 1
In fact, he wrote, "[t]he Court's historical argument depends too heavily upon
questionable assertions of fact and selective presentation of evidence." 12 2 While there
is a long history of tax exemptions for religion, there is an equally long history of
criticisms of those exemptions. 123 Moreover, through much of the country's early
history, exemptions were available, not to religion at large, but to established
churches, while dissenting religions faced taxation. 121
Still, the Seventh Circuit adopted the Town of Greece historical significance test
as one of its analytical tools. Town of Greece provides that "[a]ny test the Court
adopts must acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has
withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change."1 2 5 In this Section, I will
take that analysis seriously. Rather than imagining 200 years of unbroken tax
exemptions for religion, this Section will proceed to look at the history of tax
exemptions for religion within the framework that the Supreme Court and the
Seventh Circuit adopted as the historical significance test. First, I will look broadly
at religious tax exemptions in the country's founding years. Then, I will look at the
specific history of state tax exemptions for parsonages.
A.

A (Brief) History of Religious Property Tax Exemptions

Today, every state and the District of Columbia exempts at least some religiouslyowned property from its property tax. 126 Those exemptions do not always trace an
unbroken, uncontroversial line back to the founding of the country or the state. 127 In
the following sections, I will attempt to unveil the "questionable assertions of fact
and selective presentation of evidence" 128 that have dogged judicial decisions
looking at the history of religious tax exemptions. The following subsection will look
at religious tax exemptions as they existed during the founding years of the United
States. The next subsection will look at how property tax exemptions for religious
property developed over the course of the nineteenth century.

120. Id. (citing John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property:HistoricalAnomaly or
Valid ConstitutionalPractice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 363, 365-66 (1991)).
121. Witte, supra note 120, at 365-66.
122. Id. at 367.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014).
See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.

127. Witte, supra note 120, at 367.

128. Id.
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1. At the Time of the Framers
Before looking at the state of religious tax exemptions at the time of the Framers,
a caveat: the existence of tax exemptions for religious property in the founding years
provides very little information about the Framers' views of the constitutionality of
such exemptions. While the meaning of "direct tax" in the Constitution is not
completely clear, it certainly includes a tax on real property. 129 As such, the
Constitution would require the federal government to apportion the property tax to
the states according to their populations.13 0 This apportionment would lead to citizens
paying different rates of tax on their property depending on the population of the
state they lived in.131 An apportioned property tax could "create great inequality and
injustice," 13 2 and thus, federal direct taxes were rare.13 3 States face no such
limitation.13 4 Because the federal government could not realistically tax real
property, questions of the tax treatment of religious property necessarily find their
answers at the state level.
It is also important to keep in mind that during the first 150 years of the United
States, the religion clauses did not apply to limit state governments' actions. The
Establishment Clause was not incorporated against the states until 1947.135 Early
state constitutions generally adopted whatever religious protections the state had
offered prior to independence.136 As a result, state treatment of religious property
does little to elucidate the constitutional limitations of tax benefits to religion. 13 7
Nonetheless, in this Article's bid to explore the historical significance of tax-free
parsonages, I will look at how the early states treated religious property for tax
purposes.

129.

Dawn Johnsen & Walter Dellinger, The Constitutionality of a National Wealth Tax,

93 IND. L.J. 111, 121 (2018) ("Finally, real property or land taxes constitute the third 'other
direct' tax that the evidence suggests the Framers may have had in mind."); see also Erik M.
Jensen, Did the Sixteenth Amendment Ever Matter? Does It Matter Today?, 108 Nw. U. L.

REv. 799, 808 (2014) ("And we can be certain that a tax on real property is direct.").
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. For a more thorough discussion of federal direct taxes,
see infra notes 371-81.
131. Cf Samuel D. Brunson, Payingfor Gun Violence, 104 MINN. L. REv. 605, 628-29
(2019).

132. Hyltonv. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796).
133. See infra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
134. Evgeny Magidenko, Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes, 45 U.

BALT. L. REv. 57, 126 (2015) ("Unlike the federal government, the states do not have any
federal constitutional restrictions on their ability to levy direct taxes.").
135. "The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted
by this Court in its decisions concerning an individual's religious freedom rendered since the
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable to state
action abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same application and
broad interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause." Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the
Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND.

L.J. 669, 670 (2013).
136.

Witte, supra note 120, at 380.

137. For a discussion of state constitutions' treatment of religion, see infra Section III.A.2.
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In many cases, the early states exempted church property from taxation. The
reason for such continued exemptions is unclear: they "simply continued, even as
churches were disestablished, with little apparent discussion." 138 The importance of
the existing exemptions is also debatable in many cases. Unlike today, in the early
Republic, states were inconsistent in imposing and collecting taxes. As of 1796, for
instance, New York had not levied a general or direct tax in eight years. 139 In fact,
New York's laws did not even define objects of taxation.14 Instead, "the Legislature
determines the quotas to be paid by counties, [and] the supervisors of counties
determine the quotas of towns, which last are apportioned to individuals by
assessors." 14 1 While Pennsylvania had a defined set of tax laws, it, too, went a full
decade without imposing a general tax. 142
Many of the states continued their colonial tax exemptions for churches and for
ministers of the gospel after Independence. At the time, individuals' income was
largely irrelevant, except in Delaware, which solely imposed an income tax.143 The
other states imposed poll and property taxes as part of their panoply of taxes.14 4 A
number of states exempted ministers of the gospel from their poll taxes, while more
exempted church property from the property tax. In neither event, though, was the
benefit of exemption allowed solely to religion.
For example, Pennsylvania exempted ministers from its poll tax. 14 5 It also
exempted schoolmasters, mechanics, and manufacturers. 14 6 Connecticut exempted
"settled ministers of the Christian religion" and the president of Yale college. 14 7
Rhode Island also exempted settled ministers of the Christian religion from poll
taxes.148 In Massachusetts, settled ministers were joined by the "president, fellows,
professors, tutors, librarian, and students of Harvard college," as well as grammarschool masters and the masters of other academies.14 9 Vermont similarly exempted
"settled ministers of the Christian religion, the president and tutors of colleges,
constant schoolmasters, students of colleges, until three years after receiving their
first academical degrees; as, also, in favor of persons disabled by sickness or
infirmity." 1 50
And how did the states treat religious property under their property tax regimes?
Those that granted exemptions for religious property did so in one of three manners:

138.

STEPHEN

DIAMOND,

EFFICIENCY

EXEMPTIONS IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA

AND

BENEVOLENCE:

in PROPERTY-TAX

PHILANTHROPIC

TAX

115,
118 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002).
139. See H.R. DOC. No. 4-100, at 425 (1796).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 427.
143. Id. at 429.
144. A "poll tax" is a tax under which "[e]veryone is assessed a tax bill that does not depend
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES

on how much they earn or any other economic activity." LEONARD E. BURMAN & JOEL

TAXES IN AMERICA: WHAT EVERYONE
H.R. DOC. No. 4-100, at 427 (1796).
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 418.

SLEMROD,

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

NEEDS TO KNOW

128 (2012).
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they exempted ministers broadly from poll and property taxes, they exempted
property based on its ownership, or they exempted property based on its use.
Connecticut and Massachusetts provide examples of the first manner: they exempted
ministers from their poll taxes and also exempted the ministers' property from
property tax.15 1 Vermont also exempted ministers' property, but only to the extent its
value did not exceed 500 pounds.1 5 2 (States that exempted property owned by
ministers from property tax also exempted the property of other classes of people
who were exempt from the poll tax.)
The second manner of exemption was for property belonging to religious
organizations. South Carolina was the only state fitting into this category, with an
exemption for "[p]roperty belonging to religious or charitable societies, cities, or free
schools."1 5 3 Delaware theoretically also fit into this category, but its income tax was
not working well. In 1796, it had enacted, though not yet implemented, a property
tax which would exempt, among other things, "property belonging to ... any ...
religious society."15 4
The final manner of exemption looked at the use of the property. In addition to
exempting the property of ministers, Connecticut exempted "all lands or buildings
sequestered for schools, or other public or pious uses." 15 5 Maryland exempted
"houses for public worship," 156 while Virginia and Rhode Island were more explicit
about their use requirement, with both states exempting "houses dedicated to public
worship." 15 7
This ad hoc collection of approaches to religious exemptions is hardly surprising.
In these early years there was not yet a "universal system of taxation, no general
property tax that attempted to identify all property within the jurisdiction and tax it
at the same ad valorem rate." 158 Exemptions existed more as a way to demonstrate
government favoritism than as an instrument of financial benefit. 159 Exemptions were
largely carried over from colonial days, before the passage of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. It would be a century and a half until the Establishment Clause
even applied to the states. While the early tax laws of several states did exempt
religious property from taxation, baldly pointing to them as evidence that religious
property tax exemptions have been acceptable since the Founding era "ignores the
160
variety of theories that supported these laws."
Looking at the state-level property tax exemptions around the time of the
Founding does little more to help determine the historical significance of an
exemption for parsonages. Its lack of relevance comes in part because the

151. Id. at 420, 424.
152. Id. at 418.
153. Id. at 435.
154. Id. at 429.
155. Id. at 424.
156. Id. at 429.
157. Id. at 423, 431.
158. DIAMOND, supra note 138, at 118-19.
159. Id. at 119.
160. Witte, supra note 120, at 367. Those theories ranged from support for exemption
deriving from "the almost innate promptings of the human heart" to the lack of income from
property. Diamond, supra note 138, at 121-22.
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Establishment Clause was irrelevant to the question of what states could do. It is also
unhelpful because the exemptions that existed for religious property never explicitly
mentioned parsonages. Certain minister-owned property was exempt, and certain
property used as a house of worship was exempt, but only one state exempted
property by virtue of being owned by a church. To understand the place of parsonages
in state tax regimes, then, will require us to look at tax developments over the
subsequent two centuries.
2. Religious Property Taxes after the Founding
While the early states largely kept their colonial property tax exemptions intact,
the exemptions were largely ad hoc, and largely limited to organizations that had
received exemption as part of their initial charter. By the late nineteenth century, the
foundations of those exemptions had grown shaky. 161 Disestablishment, the states'
move away from English equity law, and the emerging preference for universal, not
selective, taxation meant that states would have to come up with a new theory of
exemption if they were to continue to exempt religious property from taxation.1 6 2
The country began to come to a general consensus about exempting religious
property from its general property taxes: states should exempt church property from
taxation because churches benefited both society in general and the state in
particular.16 3 If that were the case-and there was broad agreement that it was-the
exemption benefitted, not religion, but the state itself.164 In fact, proponents of
exemption argued that taxing church property would "be unjust and injurious both to
the churches and to the State." 165
Still, this emerging consensus faced growing pains. In particular, it is worth
looking at California and at the District of Columbia to illustrate that the line between
carryover colonial exemptions and the modern religious property tax exemption is
not a clean line.
The District of Columbia provides an instructive look at how the federal
government viewed property tax exemptions for religious property. While the
Establishment Clause did not apply to the states until its incorporation in 1947,166 the
Bill of Rights directly constrains the District of Columbia, "without need for the
intermediary of incorporation." 16 7
In 1874, Congress enacted a property tax in the District of Columbia, taxing
property in Washington at a rate of three percent of assessed value, in Georgetown

161. Witte, supra note 120, at 380-81.
162. Id. at 381-86.
163. Id. at 386-87.
164. Id. at 387. Still, some continued to oppose the exemption of religious property from
the property tax. Many critics "focused on Catholic opulence . . . and contrasted it to a
Protestant esthetic of simplicity." Diamond, supra note 138, at 126. Others even included
"ostentatious Protestant churches in the condemnation." Id.
165. Henry W. Foote, The Taxation of Churches, 7 UNITARIAN REV. & RELIGIOUS
MAGAZINE 349, 351 (1877).
166.

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

167. Parkerv. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 391 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff'dsub nom. D.C. v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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of 2.5 percent, and outside of those two cities, at two percent.16' The law exempted
property owned by the federal government, the District of Columbia, and by
charitable and educational institutions. 169 The tax commissioners in the District
understood that this exemption did not include churches, and began to levy taxes on
religious property.170 The District continued to tax churches for five years, until
Congress passed a new law repealing the property tax as it applied to "church
property which was actually held and used for the purpose of divine worship."1 7 1
Congress not only exempted churches in the District of Columbia from the property
tax-it also returned to the religious trustees the title of church property that had been
sold for nonpayment of taxes and required the District to refund property taxes that
had been paid by churches. 172 Ultimately the District of Columbia's experiment with
taxing church property had no substantive lasting impact. Nonetheless, for five years
in the late nineteenth century, the federal government imposed a property tax on all
religiously owned property, including parsonages. 173
California, too, taxed religiously owned property for more than thirty years.
Acquired by the United States in 1848,174 the territory of California became a state
two years later.17 5 Between its acquisition by the United States and its attaining
statehood, California drafted and ratified a constitution. 176 That original constitution
illustrated the move to universal taxation, providing that "[t]axation shall be equal
and uniform throughout the State. All property in this State shall be taxed in
proportion to its value .... "177
In spite of the state constitution's plain language, the California legislature
originally provided for pre-statehood exemptions to continue.1 78 Thus, by 1859,
California law exempted land owned by:
[C]olleges, school houses and other buildings for the purpose of
education, public hospitals, asylums, poor houses and other charitable
institutions for the relief of the indigent and afflicted, churches, chapels
and other buildings for religious worship, together with lots of ground
and other property appurtenant thereto; cemeteries and graveyards; the

168. An Act for the Government of the District of Columbia, and for Other Purposes, ch.
337, 18 Stat. 117 § 4 (1874).
169. Id.

170.

See Diamond, supra note 138, at 125.

171. An Act to Relieve the Churches of the District of Columbia, and to Clear the Title of
the Trustees of Such Property, ch. 33, 21 Stat. 23 (1879).
172. Id.
173. Moreover, it is not clear that the 1879 law would have exempted parsonages. Its
language was limited to property used for "the purpose of divine worship." Id. That use
requirement has gone different ways in different jurisdictions.
174.

Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without

Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 581, 582 (2001).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 586.
177. CAL. CONST. OF 1849, art. XI, § 13.

178.

Diamond, supra note 138, at 120.
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property of widows and orphan children to the amount of one thousand
dollars; growing crops and mining claims. 7 9
The state supreme court stripped virtually all of these property tax exemptions away
in 1868.180 The court explained that if the legislature had the power to exempt crops
and mining claims, "the exemption may be carried still further, until property of one
class is made to bear the whole burden of taxation." 181 Any exemption that included
private property, the court held, was "in plain violation of the command of the
Constitution."18 2
In 1900, California amended its constitution to allow for the exemption of
religious property. 8 3 But for the more than three decades between the McCreery
decision and the amendment of the state constitution, California's property tax
exemplified the policy of universal taxation, and religious organizations paid
property tax on their property. Because the state's gap in exemption resulted from a
policy of universal taxation in its state constitution, it does not speak to the
constitutionality of exempting parsonages from the property tax. It does, however,
undercut the clean narrative of two centuries of unbroken tax exemption for religious
property. The Establishment Clause did not prohibit states or the federal government
from taxing religiously owned property.184
IV. PROPERTY TAXES AND PARSONAGES

Even after religious property tax exemptions became universal, the question of
the treatment of parsonages did not. While most states expressly exempt houses of
worship from their property tax, in many states other property belonging to religious
organizations qualifies for exemption only if its use qualifies as religious or
otherwise charitable. 18 5 When it comes to parsonages, states have answered the
question of whether the property tax exemption applies inconsistently, both across
states and across time. In this part, I will first categorize states according to whether
and how they currently exempt parsonages from their property tax. Next, to
determine whether the exemptions have "withstood the critical scrutiny of time and
political change," 18 6 I will look at those states that have changed their property tax
treatment of parsonages.

179. People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432, 457 (1868).
180.

Diamond, supra note 138, at 120.

181. McCreery, 34 Cal. at 457.
182. Id.
183.

Diamond, supra note 138, at 120.

184. Even today, mere religious ownership does not guarantee property tax exemptions. In
Illinois, for example, an exempt church that leases space in its building to a preschool must
pay property tax on that portion of the property used by the preschool. First Presbyterian
Church of Libertyville v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, No. 09 PT 0066 (2010),
https://www2.illinois.gov/rev/research/legalinformation/hearings/pt/Documents/pt10- 10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/968W-H838].
185. See, e.g., JANNE GALLAGHER, THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION,
in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD 3, 5 (Evelyn Brody
ed., 2002).
186. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014).
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A. CurrentProperty Tax Treatment of Parsonages
Today, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia statutorily exempt
parsonages from property tax. 187 The other twenty-one states provide constitutional
or statutory property tax exemptions for at least some religious property, but do not
specifically exempt parsonages. In eight of these states, courts (or, in one case,
regulations) include parsonages in the set of exempt religiously owned property. 188
In three states, courts allow the exemption of some parsonages, depending on the use
of those parsonages. 189 In three states, the general religious property tax exemption
does not exempt parsonages from paying property taxes. 190 In the remaining four
states, courts have not ruled on the question of whether parsonages qualify as exempt
religious property.191
1. Explicit Exemptions
Even among the states that explicitly exempt parsonages by statute, the exemption
is not always absolute. All impose certain limits and requirements on the property
tax exemption. For example, every state that explicitly exempts parsonages requires
that the parsonage be owned by the religious organization, not by individual

clergy.

192

There are also other requirements that differ among the various jurisdictions. In
Washington, D.C., any given church or congregation can own only one parsonage

187. See infra Appendix 1 for a list of the states that explicitly exempt parsonages from the
property tax. It is important to note that, while I include Hawaii among the twenty-nine states
that explicitly exempt parsonages, it is in a slightly odd position: in 2016, the state eliminated
its state real property tax. 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws 85, 86 § 6. Years earlier, the Hawaii Supreme
Court held that the state's constitution had shifted the authority to tax real property from the
state to the counties. State ex rel. Anzai v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 57 P.3d 433, 435 (Haw.
2002). Prior to the 2016 repeal, state law exempted "[p]roperty used for church purposes,
including . . parsonages." HI REV. STAT. § 246-32(b)(3) (2012). While the Hawaii legislature
repealed that provision in 2016, four of the five counties in Hawaii have enacted a property
tax exemption with identical language. MAUI, HAW., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 3.48.495(b)(3);
HAW., CNTY. CODE 1983 § 19-77(b)(3) (2016 Edition, as amended); HONOLULU, HAW., REV.
ORDINANCE 8-10.10(b)(3); KAUAI, HAW., 3 CNTY. CODE Tit. III, § 5A-11.10(b)(3).
188. See infra Appendix 2.
189. See infra Appendix 3.
190. See infra Appendix 4.
191. See infra Appendix 5.
192. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 29.45.030(b) (West) (exempting parsonages as long
as they are owned by a religious organization); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 462 (McKinney)
(exempting "property owned by a religious corporation while actually used by the officiating
clergymen thereof for residential purposes"). New York provides a partial exception to this
broader rule. The New York property tax law provides a special exemption for "[r]eal property
owned by a minister of the gospel, priest or rabbi of any denomination." N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx
LAW § 460 (McKinney). For any such clergy residing in the state, up to $1500 of real property
is exempt from the state property tax. Id. This exemption is not precisely an exemption of a
parsonage, though: it is not limited to residential real property, nor to property used or
occupied by clergy.
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that is exempt from property taxation.193 New Jersey exempts up to two parsonages
owned by "any religious corporation of this State."194
New Jersey also exempts the land parsonages sit on, as long as that land does not
exceed five acres. 195 North Dakota limits the size of exempt parsonages to two acres
if the parsonage is not located on the same parcel of land as the buildings used for
religious purposes. 196 Rhode Island limits the exempt amount of land on which a
parsonage sits to the greater of one acre or the minimum lot size permitted where the
parsonage is located.197
Texas imposes a size limitation similar to Rhode Island's: Texas exempts real
property owned by a religious organization that "is reasonably necessary for use as
a residence," but in no event larger than one acre. 198 In addition, to qualify for the
exemption, the parsonage must be used "exclusively as a residence" for clergy and
cannot produce any revenue for the religious organization that owns it.199 In Indiana,
while parsonages are exempt from property tax, the religious organization that owns
it must provide an affidavit to the assessor stating that the parsonage houses clergy
and that the religious organization does not make a profit from the parsonage.2 00
Maine goes another direction with its limitations. Instead of limiting the size of
exempt parsonages, it limits the exempt value. A parsonage in Maine is exempt from
property taxation on its first $20,000 of value. 20 1 Illinois goes yet another direction.
Property owned by religious organizations and used as housing for clergy is exempt,
provided that the clergy must, "as a condition of their employment or association,
reside in the facility." 20 2
These twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have made the explicit
legislative decision to exempt parsonages from the property tax. It is important to
keep in mind, though, that none of these states provides an unconstrained exemption
for any housing designated as a parsonage. Rather, they all require that the parsonage
be owned by an exempt religious organization. Many also impose additional
limitations, including limitations on the size, location, or value of the parsonage. In
all of these states, there is an implicit recognition that exempting parsonages is an
exception from the general rule of property tax, one that must be made explicit in the
statute.

193. D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1002 (West).
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West).
195. Id.
196. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 57-02-08(9)(a) (West). If the parsonage is located on the
same parcel of land, North Dakota does not impose any acreage limitations. Id.
197. 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3 (West).
198. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20(a)(3) (West).
199. Id.
200. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-21(c).
201. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 652(1)(G).
202. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-40(b). That requirement mirrors the federal income tax's
general exclusion for employer-provided housing, available only if, among other
requirements, "the employee is required to accept such lodging on the business premises of
his employer as a condition of his employment." I.R.C. § 119(a)(2).
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2. Non-Statutory Exemptions for Parsonages
The remaining twenty-one states do not constitutionally or statutorily exempt
parsonages from their property taxes. They do, however, exempt at least some
religiously owned or used property. Many use a similar formulation to determine
whether the property tax reaches religious property: they exempt property that is both
owned by a religious organization and is used exclusively for religious purposes. 203
The question then becomes whether housing clergy is a religious purpose under the
property tax exemption.
Eight states have concluded that it is. For seven states in this category, the courts
have exempted parsonages. For instance, in Delaware there is a statutory exemption
for property "owned by . . . any church or religious society, and not held by way of
investment." 204 When the city of Wilmington assessed a city and school tax against
a rectory building owned by Roman Catholic Diocese of Wilmington, the diocese
challenged the validity of the assessment. 2 5 The diocese argued that a rectory fell
within the state's exemption from property tax, while the city argued the opposite. 206
The court ultimately found that it fit within the statutory exemption for religious
property because the rectory belonged to a religious organization, and because it was
not held for investment. 207
The Nebraska statutory exemption for religious property applies to a narrower
slice of property. As with Delaware, in Nebraska a religious organization must both
own the land and not use it for financial gain. 208 In addition, for religiously owned
property to qualify for the exemption, a religious organization must use the land
"exclusively for . . . religious . . . purposes."209
Nebraska courts had to wrestle with the question of whether housing clergy
qualified as a religious purpose. Surprisingly, they did not wrestle with the question
until the 1990s.210 The court emphasized that "exclusively" meant "primarily," and

203. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. X, § 6(1); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 427.1(8)(a) (West)
(exempting property "owned by a religious institution . . if all monetary and in-kind profits
of the religious institution or society resulting from use or lease of the grounds are used
exclusively by the religious institution or society for the appropriate objects of the institution
or society").
204. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 8105 (West).
205. St. Stanislaus Kostka Church v. Mayor of Wilmington, 105 A.2d 596, 597 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1954).
206. Id. at 598.
207. Id. at 599.
208. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-202(1)(d) (West). Nebraska law imposes two other rules
that are not relevant here. Exempt land cannot be used to sell alcoholic liquors for more than
twenty hours per week and cannot be owned by organizations that discriminate based on an
individual's race, color, or national origin. Id.
209. Id.
210. Nebraska Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church v. Scotts Bluff Cnty. Bd. of
Equalization, 499 N.W.2d. 543, 547 (Neb. 1993) ("This is the first opportunity for this court
to address the question of whether a cleric's use of a parsonage constitutes exclusive religious
use for exemption purposes."). Perhaps the question had never come to the courts previously
because the taxing authorities in Nebraska had previously assumed that parsonages qualified
as tax-exempt, notwithstanding the ambiguity in the law. Id. at 545 ("The parsonage has
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that incidental non-religious use would not cost a property its tax exemption.21 Still,
to qualify as tax exempt, housing clergy has to qualify as a religious purpose. The
court determined that it does, as long as the housed member of clergy engages in
ministerial work full time, the employer-church provides the housing for the church's
and its members' convenience, and the parsonage "serves numerous religious
purposes." 212
Oklahoma courts had to make a similar determination. Like Nebraska, the
Oklahoma constitution exempts "all property used exclusively for religious and
charitable purposes." 213 While the Oklahoma constitution does not appear to impose
an ownership requirement, it imposes a similar exclusive use requirement. The court
explained that this exclusive use requirement had three parts: the parsonage had to
be owned by a church and to house a pastor engaged in full-time ministerial work,
the church had to provide the parsonage as part of the pastor's compensation, and the
parsonage had to "serve[] various religious purposes." 214 As long as it met these
criteria, the court said, it met the exclusive use requirement and qualified for tax
exemption.21
While the Oklahoma court came to the same conclusion as the Nebraska court,
the conclusion was neither inevitable nor uncontroversial. In fact, one judge
dissented from the court's conclusion. Justice Hodges pointed out that the parsonage
was a "private dwelling residence," not unlike any other non-exempt private
residence. 2 1 6 In general, the dissent explained, exemptions from property tax are
strictly construed. 217 Because the use of a parsonage was personal rather than
religious, and because the state constitution did not expressly list parsonages as
exempt, the dissent argued that any ambiguity in the constitution should be read
against granting the exemption.
In looking at non-statutory exemptions for parsonages, New Mexico, the eighth
state in this category, is something of an outlier. Under New Mexico's constitution,
"all church property not used for commercial purposes . . . shall be exempt from
taxation." 2 81 While a parsonage could certainly fit into the category of church
property not used for commercial purposes, the property tax statute is unhelpful in
determining whether the constitutional exemption includes parsonages. It merely
provides that all property is subject to property tax valuation unless explicitly
exempted. 219 And, in relevant part, it explicitly exempted "property exempt from
property taxation under the federal or state constitution, federal law, the Property Tax
Code or other laws." 2 2 Rather than relying on the courts to determine whether

continuously applied for, and received, tax-exempt status in the past, and on December 27,
1989, application was made by United Methodist for continued tax exemption.").
211. Id. at 547.
212. Id. at 548.
213. OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
214. Immanuel Baptist Church v. Glass, 497 P.2d 757, 760 (Okla. 1972).
215. Id.
216. Id. (Hodges, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 761 (Hodges, J., dissenting).
218. N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
219. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-36-7(A) (West).
220. Id. § 7-36-7(B)(1).
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qualifies as church property not used for commercial purposes, New Mexico enacted
regulations providing that the state constitution's exemption includes both buildings
used for religious purposes and buildings used "for residences of the priests,
ministers, chaplains, pastors or rabbis." 22 1
As with the states that explicitly exempt parsonages from the property tax,
parsonages end up being exempt in these states. They are not exempt, though, as a
result of legislative decision. Instead, they are exempt because courts have
determined that housing clergy meets the broad exemption requirements for
religiously owned property broadly. By and large, courts in these states have
determined that providing housing for clergy serves primarily religious purposes, and
that the personal benefits to clergy are, at most, incidental.
3. Parsonage Exemption Depends on Use
As with the prior category, California, Oregon, and Tennessee provide for a
general property tax exemption for religious property, but none of the three states
expressly exempts parsonages. Unlike the eight states in the prior category, though,
courts have held that parsonages qualify for the exemption, but only under certain
circumstances.
The California property tax exemption for religious property is similar in many
ways to Nebraska's. It too applies to property used "exclusively for religious ...
purposes" and owned by religious entities. 222 The law goes on to specify that the
owner cannot be organized for profit, that the net earnings of the owner cannot inure
to the benefit of any individual or shareholder, and that the owner use the property
"for the actual operation of the exempt activity." 2 2 3 For parsonages, this raises similar
questions as those answered by the Nebraska court: is housing clergy an exclusively
religious purpose, and is it the actual operation of the exempt activity?
In answering these questions, the California Court of Appeals explained that
whether a parsonage qualified for exemption had to be determined on a case-by-case
basis. 224 The owner of the parsonage had the burden of demonstrating that it used the
parsonage "for some type of institutional necessity" and that this institutional
necessity was something more than merely providing a residence for clergy. 225
Oregon provides an even narrower religious exemption from property tax than
California. "[H]ouses of public worship" owned by religious institutions qualify for
the exemption. 2 26 Other property owned by religious institutions qualifies, too,
provided that property is used by the religious organization "solely for
administration, education, literary, benevolent, charitable, entertainment[,] and
recreational purposes." 22 7

221. N.M. ADMIN. CODE 3.6.5.15(L)(2) (as amended in 2001).
222. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 214(a).
223. Id.

224. First United Methodist Church v. L.A. Cnty., 208 Cal. Rptr. 85, 91 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
225. Id.
226. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 307.140(1) (West).
227. Id.
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In determining whether religious property is exempt from property tax, Oregon
courts apply a two-prong inquiry. The first prong asks whether the religious use of
the property is "primarily for the benefit of the church." 2 28 The second prong asks
whether the religious use of the property is "reasonably necessary for the furthering
of the religious aims of the church." 2 2 9
The court's analysis under the first prong recognizes the distinction between
primary and incidental benefits. As long as the religious organization gets the
primary benefit of the use of the property, incidental benefits to individuals will not
disqualify it.230 By contrast, where the primary benefit lies elsewhere, and the
religious organization only receives an incidental benefit, the property will fail the
first prong.
The second prong applies differently to residential property than it does to nonresidential property. 231 For residential property such as a parsonage to qualify as
exempt, the religious organization must require the clergy member to live there
(either as a matter of religious doctrine or out of practical necessity) and "the
proximity of the residence to the house of worship must be necessary to further
religious objectives." 232
So, for instance, where the "continuous presence" of clergy is needed "to attend
to the religious needs of the congregation," and the parsonage is "substantially used
for church functions or rites, entertaining or counseling members of the church and
the like," a parsonage can qualify as tax-exempt under Oregon law. 23 3 Oregon courts
are perfectly willing to hold that religious organizations must pay property tax on
parsonages that do not meet the two criteria. 23 4
Finally, Tennessee also exempts property owned by religious institutions
provided that the religious institution uses the property for "carrying out one (1) or
more of the exempt purposes for which the institution was created or exists." 235 As
with Oregon and Nebraska, the statutory exemption does not explicitly include
parsonages. The Tennessee Court of Appeals explained that, while parsonages may
qualify as exempt, they "per se, are not given exemption under the statute; only those
pieces of property that are used purely and exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific or educational purposes are exempt." 236 In Tennessee, the court held that
merely housing clergy-even where the clergy uses the parsonage as a home base

228. Washington Cnty. Assessor v. W. Beaverton Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses,
Inc., 18 Or. Tax 409, 418 (2006).
229. Id.

230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 419. These standards are nearly identical to the requirements of the for-theconvenience-of-the-employer exclusion for employer-provided housing. See I.R.C. § 119.
233. German Apostolic Christian Churchv. Dep't of Revenue, 569 P.2d 596, 599-600 (Or.
1977).
234. See, e.g., Washington Cnty. v. Dep't of Revenue, 11 Or. Tax 251, 254-55 (1989)
(holding that a parsonage, used primarily for housing, did not qualify for a property tax
exemption).
235. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-212(a)(1) (West 2018).

236. Blackwood Bros. Evangelistic Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, 614 S.W.2d 364,
366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).
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for their evangelizing-does not make its use exclusively religious. 237 The Tennessee
court also held that even using a parsonage purely and exclusively for religious
purposes does not automatically grant it a property tax exemption; any given church
can only own one property tax-exempt parsonage. 238
These three states are similar to the seven states that judicially exempted all
parsonages. They, too, had to grapple with the question of whether providing housing
for clergy constituted the carrying out of a religious purpose. Unlike the previous
seven, though, their courts determined that housing clergy only sometimes primarily
benefited the religious organization. Parsonages used solely for housing clergy did
not qualify. As such, the question of exempting parsonages from the property tax in
these states is a question of fact, and each parsonage must be considered individually.
4. Parsonages Are Not Exempt
Like the states discussed in the previous two subsections, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Utah have a general property tax exemption for some property owned by religious
institutions. In these three states, however, the exemption does not extend to
parsonages. The reasoning differs in each state, but the result is the same: religious
organizations that own parsonages in these three states must pay property tax on
those parsonages.
Ohio law exempts "[h]ouses used exclusively for public worship, the books and
furniture in them, and the ground attached to them" from the property tax, as long as
the houses are not leased or otherwise used for profit. 239 It also exempts real property
"owned and operated by a church that is used primarily for church retreats or church
camping, and that is not used as a permanent residence." 24 0
By definition, a parsonage is used as a permanent residence by clergy and is
therefore excluded from the exemption. In 1989, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a
decision by the state's Board of Tax Appeals holding that a parsonage did not qualify
as exempt from property taxation. 24 1 More recently, in dicta, the supreme court
characterized the idea that residential property does not qualify for tax exemption as
"well-settled," 24 2 though only the dissent referred explicitly to the statutory exclusion
24 3
of permanent residences.
Unlike Ohio, Pennsylvania does not explicitly exclude parsonages from its
property tax exemption. Rather, it provides a general religious exemption for "[a]ll
churches, meeting-houses, or other actual places of regularly stated religious
worship." 24 4 According to the courts, regularly stated religious worship means that
the "primary application" of the property must be for regularly scheduled and

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2019).

240. Id. § 5709.07(A)(3).
241. Full Gospel Apostolic Church v. Limbach, 546 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio 1989).
242. Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa, 36 N.E.3d 136, 141 (Ohio 2015).
243. Id. at 150 (O'Connor, C.J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the majority may not
have mentioned the statutory exclusion because the taxpayer did not refer to it in claiming its
property tax exemption. Id.
244. 72 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5020-204(a)(1) (West 2013).
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consistent "conduct of worship." 245 Meanwhile, the actual place requirement does
not require that the property be used solely for worship. Rather, its "primary purpose"
must be worship, but a qualifying property does not lose its exemption if it has other
incidental uses. 24 6
Under this analysis, parsonages do not qualify as actualplaces of regularlystated
religious worship. In dealing with whether a building that was formerly used as a
parsonage was exempt from tax, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
acknowledged, offhandedly and without analysis, that "[t]he home was used as a
parsonage until August 23, 2001, during which time it was taxable." 247 Given the
relatively specific requirements under Pennsylvania statutory and common law, a
parsonage used principally for housing clergy is subject to state property tax.
Finally, the Utah Constitution exempts "property owned by a nonprofit entity used
exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes." 24 8 As with other states
that have an exemption that excludes property used "exclusively" for religious
purposes, Utah courts had to determine whether housing clergy qualified as an
exclusive religious purpose. In 1976, the question of whether parsonages qualified
for exemption reached the Utah Supreme Court for the first time. 24 9 The court looked
to other states without an express exemption, and determined that, while decisions
went both ways, "the decided weight of authority supports the rule that parsonages,
residences of ministers, and parish houses owned by a church and occupied as a
residence by the pastor or priest of a church are not exempt from property taxes. 2 0
Even though the church used the parsonage for some incidental church purposes, the
court found that incidental church use did not meet the exclusive standard required
by the state constitution.25 1
5. Are Parsonages Exempt?
Finally, four states do not explicitly exempt parsonages and courts have not
adjudicated the question of exemption. Alabama exempts "all property, real and
personal, used exclusively for religious worship."25 2 In Arizona, the religious
property tax exemption applies to property "used or held primarily for religious
worship." 25 3 Colorado exempts property "which is owned and used solely and
exclusively for religious purposes." 25 4 Finally, the Kentucky Constitution exempts

245. Mount Zion New Life Ctr. v. Bd. of Assessment & Revision of Taxes & Appeals, 503
A.2d 1065, 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
246. Id. at 1071.
247. Connellsville St. Church of Christ v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 838
A.2d 848, 850 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
248. UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 3(1)(f).
249. Salt Lake Cnty. v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. Good Shepherd Lutheran Church, 548 P.2d
630, 631 (Utah 1976).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. ALA. CODE § 40-9-1(1) (LexisNexis 2011).
253. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-11109(A) (2018).
254. COLO. REV. STAT ANN. § 39-3-106(1) (West 2019).
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"real property owned and occupied by, and personal property both tangible and
intangible owned by, institutions of religion. "255
These four states' property tax exemptions for religious property are similar to the
exemptions of other states without an explicit exemption for parsonages. Whether a
parsonage is exempt under their laws depends, in general, on whether the state
considers housing clergy a religious or secular use. As we have seen, the answer is
not obvious. Without some sort of administrative or judicial determination, it is not
clear whether parsonages in these four states qualify for the religious property tax
exemption.
B. HistoricDifferences in the Treatment of Parsonages
While the current property tax treatment of parsonages by the various states
illustrates that exempting parsonages is neither necessary nor inevitable, the
historical significance test requires courts to look not only at the present, but also at
the past. And, appropriately, the Seventh Circuit did not rest its historical
significance analysis merely on states' present treatment of parsonages. Rather, the
court held that the government, intervenors, and amici supporting the government
had "provided substantial evidence of a lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for
religion, particularly for church-owned property."256 The varying approaches of
current state laws demonstrates the degree to which this assertion brushes over the
manner in which states analyze whether religiously owned property qualifies for
exemption (which generally requires not only religious ownership, but also religious
use).
The court's broad assertion also overlooks the historical variation in states'
property tax. Currently, the vast majority of states either explicitly exempt
parsonages or find that parsonages can, under some circumstances, fit within the
scope of the religious property tax exemption. Even in those states that grant an
exemption for parsonages, the history of that exemption is often not a clean,
unbroken line back through history. In a number of states, the courts initially found
that parsonages were not exempt, which conclusion was, in some cases, overturned
by state legislatures in the early- to mid-twentieth century. Some jurisdictions even
went through periods in which no religiously owned property qualified for property
tax exemptions. These changes in tax treatment highlight that exemption was not
inevitable and that history does not clearly lean in the direction of exemption.
If the Seventh Circuit is correct that the historical significance test is a proper
Establishment Clause test to apply in looking at the constitutionality of the parsonage
allowance, then we must actually look at the history of states grappling with the
question of whether to exempt parsonages from the property tax. And that history
demonstrates that, of the forty-four states and District of Columbia that clearly
sometimes or always exempt parsonages from the property tax, thirteen have, at some
point in the past, taxed parsonages. In most of these states, the law shifted to allow
an exemption for parsonages in the early- to mid-twentieth century. These thirteen
states represent about thirty percent of states that exempt parsonages from the

255. KY. CONST. § 170.
256. Gaylorv. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 436 (7th Cir. 2019).
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property tax. That means that about three in ten of the states that exempt parsonages
enacted that exemption relatively late in the Seventh Circuit's purported two
centuries of states "implement[ing] church property tax exemptions in various
forms." 257 Moreover, because these changes occurred before the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause, they have little relevance to the parsonage allowance's
constitutionality. The remainder of this Part will discuss the states that disallowed
property tax exemptions for parsonages at one point and now exempt them. 258 It will
divide the states (and the discussion) into three main categories: states that granted
parsonages an exemption by amending their constitutions, states that granted
parsonages an exemption legislatively, and states that granted parsonages an
exemption judicially.
1. Constitutional Change
In four states, excluding parsonages from the property tax base required a
constitutional change. In 1906, Minnesota became the first of these states to change
its constitution. As early as 1867, the state supreme court held that, under its property
tax law, a "parsonage owned by a church is not exempt from taxation." 25 9 A decade
and a half later, the court explained that a parsonage was "clearly subject to taxation"
because housing clergy was a secular, not a religious, use of property. 260 By 1891,
the court held that the question of a property tax exemption for a parsonage had been
answered so clearly that it was "therefore no longer open. "261
Then in 1906, Minnesota amended its constitution. While the amended
constitution did not explicitly provide for the exemption of parsonages, it made two
important changes to the exemption of religious property. First, it shifted from being
a permissive exemption requiring implementing legislation to a self-executing
provision. 262 Second, it took language away from the provision. Where the
constitution had previously provided for the exemption of "all churches, church
property usedfor religiouspurposes, and houses of worship," after the amendment,
the constitution provided for the exemption of "all churches, church property, and
houses of worship." 263 The court held that the "omission of these words cannot be
deemed to have been inadvertent or without a purpose." 264 Rather, it allowed
churches to be treated the same way educational institutions were treated, including

257. Id.
258. The following discussion will leave out California and the District of Columbia, both
of which eliminated all religious property tax exemptions for a period of time during the late
nineteenth century. For a discussion of California and the District of Columbia, see supra
Section III.A.2.
259. St. Peter's Church, Shakopee v. Bd. of Co. Comm'rs of Scott Cnty., 12 Minn. 395,
395 (1867).
260. In re Grace, 8 N.W. 761, 761 (Minn. 1881).
261. Ramsey Cnty. v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 47 N.W. 783, 783 (Minn. 1891).
262. State v. Church of Incarnation, 196 N.W. 802, 803 (Minn. 1924).
263. Id. at 803-04 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 804.
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allowing a property tax exemption for parsonages owned by a church and occupied
by its pastor. 2 5
Louisiana became the next of the four states to amend its constitution to grant a
property tax exemption for parsonages owned by a religious organization.
Nineteenth-century Louisiana embraced universal taxation with a general rule that
all property was subject to the property tax. 266 The state legislature exempted some
classes of property from taxation, but only within the scope granted by the state
constitution.267 The state supreme court held that "[t]he residence of the clergyman
is in no proper or legitimate sense appurtenant to the church, and is not exempt from
taxation," and therefore was not within the constitutional scope of a property tax
exemption.261
In fact, the state's 1879 constitution exempted only two types of religious property
from taxation: "places of religious worship or burial." 2 69 In its subsequent
constitution, however, the state had expanded the scope of permissible religious
exemptions from the property tax. Louisiana's constitutional expansion functioned
differently from Minnesota's, though. The 1913 Louisiana Constitution provided for
the exemption not only of places of religious worship or burial, but also "the rectories
and parsonages of churches and grounds thereunto appurtenant, used exclusively as
residences for the ministers in charge of such churches." 2 70 Rather than making the
list of constitutionally permissible exemptions broader generally, Louisiana
specifically targeted parsonages for exemption.
Next came Texas. In its 1875 constitutional convention, state legislators focused
on "[p]roviding for equal and uniform taxation." 2 7 1 In part, that focus derived from
"strong feeling[s] against exemptions previously granted by the legislature." 2 72
Similar to Louisiana's Constitution, the 1876 Texas Constitution's only exemption
for religious property applied to "actual places of religious worship." 273 To ensure
that future legislatures did not expand the constitutional list of permissible
exemptions, the constitution further provided that "all laws exempting property from
taxation other than the property above mentioned, shall be void." 2 74 In a 1906
amendment of the constitution, the legislature reemphasized its distrust of

265. Id. at 803-04.
266. First Presbyterian Churchv. City of New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 259, 260 (1878).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 207.
270. LA. CONST. of 1913, art. 230.
271. City of Austinv. Univ. ChristianChurch, 768 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mauzy, J., dissenting)
(Tex. 1988).
272. GEORGE D. BRADEN, DAVID A. ANDERSON, R. STEPHEN BICKERSTAFF, DARRELL
BLAKEWAY, RON PATTERSON, SETH S. SEARCY, THORNTON C. SINCLAIR & RICHARD A. YAHR,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

565 (1977), https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-state-of-texas
-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/BV7Y-V8WZ].
273. TEx. CONST. of 1876, art. VIII, § 2.
274. Id.
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exemptions, driving "an unnecessary nail in the exemption coffin by providing that
all other exemptions shall be not just void but null and void." 275
In 1918, a Texas court enforced the legislature's will, holding that a parsonage
was not "used exclusively for 'public worship' or 'purely public charity,"' and
therefore did not qualify for exemption from the property tax. 276 In response, the
legislature amended the state constitution.277 As of 1928, the Texas state constitution
has provided that the legislature has the authority to exempt parsonages from the
property tax. 278
More than two decades later, Georgia became the fourth state to amend its
constitution to permit parsonages to escape paying property tax. In 1887, the state
supreme court had explained that "[t]he property which belongs to a church is not
exempt from taxation simply because it belongs to a church." 2 79 In fact, the court
wrote, not only was the parsonage in question not exempt from taxation, but the
"legislature has no power to exempt it from taxation." 2 0 Any attempt at exempting
religious property other than places of public worship or burial (which were listed in
the constitution) would be "simply void." 281
In 1927, the state supreme court used parsonages to illustrate the types of property
not exempt under the state constitution. 28 2 It was not until 1953 that the legislature
proposed a voter resolution that would add the words "and all property owned by
religious groups used only for residential purposes and from which no income is
derived" to the list of permissible religious property tax exemptions. 28 3 The voters
ratified the amendment to the constitution in 1954, making Georgia the last of the
four states to enact the constitutional change necessary to permit the legislature to
exempt parsonages from the state property tax. 28 4
2. Legislative Change
In five other states, a simple legislative change (without the need for any
amendment of the constitution) sufficed to exempt parsonages. Of these states, New
Jersey had perhaps the most interesting and convoluted experience shifting from not
exempting parsonages to exempting them. In 1863, the state did not explicitly
provide for the exemption of most religious property. The sole religious exemption

275. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 272, at 596.
276. Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of San Antonio, 201 S.W. 669, 670 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918), writ refused (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
277. City of Austinv. Univ. Christian Church, 768 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Mauzy, J., dissenting)
(Tex. 1988).
278. BRADEN ET AL., supra note 272, at 595-96.
279. Wardens of St. Mark's Church v. Mayor of Brunswick, 3 S.E. 561, 561 (Ga. 1887).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. City of Columbus v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., 140 S.E. 860, 862 (Ga. 1927) ("So, while
places of religious worship may be exempted, such exemption does not embrace a parsonage
belonging to the church, in which the pastor or rector resides.").
283. H.R. 106-337j, 1953 Gen. Assemb., Nov.-Dec. Sess. (Ga. 1953).
284. Church of God of Union Assembly, Inc. v. City of Dalton, 119 S.E.2d 11, 13 (Ga.
1961).
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in its property tax was for "parsonages, with lots attached, not to exceed [$5000]."285
In 1866, the state enacted legislation that superseded the prior exemptions. It
expressly exempted "buildings erected and used for religious worship, and the land
whereon the same are situate, necessary to the fair use and enjoyment thereof, not
exceeding five acres for each one, the furniture thereof and the personal property
used therein, [and] the endowment or fund of any religious society." 28 6
While the 1866 law added buildings used for religious worship, it deleted
language expressly exempting parsonages. When the First Reformed Dutch Church
challenged the 1866 property tax assessment of a parsonage it owned, the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained that the 1866 law superseded the 1863 law. 287 According
to the court, "if the legislature had intended to continue the exemption of parsonages,
and to an unlimited value, it is not reasonable to believe that they would have left it
to the mere construction that might be forced out of the word 'endowment."' 288
In the early 1870s, the New Jersey legislature started to exempt parsonages, not
by general law, but by private laws. In 1873, it exempted the parsonage belonging to
the Presbyterian congregation in Reaville and the parsonage belonging to the Reform
Church in Middletown. 289 It was not until 1903 that New Jersey reinserted in its
property tax law an exemption for parsonages. 290 The exemption was not absolute,
though: it only exempted parsonages "owned by any religious corporation of this
state while actually used by the officiating clergyman thereof," and only exempted
parsonages up to a value of $5000.291
As late as 1960, the New Jersey legislature deliberately enacted a law only
exempting parsonages from the property tax to the extent of $5000.292 It was not until
1964 that New Jersey shifted from a limit on the value of exempt parsonages to a
limit on the number of parsonages (two) and the acreage (five) of exempt parsonages
293
that continues until today.
Other states have been less dramatic in their shifts from nonexempt to exempt,
but they have also used legislation to make that shift. In Indiana, for instance, the
legislature had exempted "building[s] erected for religious worship." 294 In 1871, the
state supreme court held that, in spite of the "careful and mature consideration" it
had given "to the very able and ingenious argument of the learned counsel for the
appellants," it was "unable to see how we can, by construction, extend the statute so
as to embrace parsonages that have been erected for the convenience and

285. Act of Mar. 25, 1863, ch. 278, § 2, 1863 N.J. LAWS 500, 502.
286. Act of Apr. 11, 1866, ch. 487, § 5(11), 1866 N.J. LAWS 1078, 1079-80.
287. First Reformed Dutch Church of New Brunswick v. Lyon, 32 N.J.L. 360, 361 (1867).
288. Id.
289. Act of Feb. 26, 1873, ch. 101, § 1, 1873 N.J. LAWS 986, 986 § 1. Interestingly, in the
late nineteenth century, a church selling its property-including its parsonage-required a
general law enacted by the New Jersey legislature. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 28, 1895, ch. 350,
§ 1, 1895 N.J. LAWS 707, 707.
290. Act of Apr. 8, 1903, ch. 208, art. 1, § 4, 1903 N.J. Laws 394, 395.
291. Id.
292. Act of Sept. 7, 1960, ch. 119, § 1, 1906 N.J. Laws 618, 619.
293. Act of May 5, 1964, ch. 42, § 1, 1964 N.J. Laws 81, 82.
294. Methodist Episcopal Churchv. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3, 7-8 (1871).
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accommodation of the pastor of the church." 2 95 That power, it said, lay in the
legislature. 296
Twenty years later, the legislature exercised that power. 297 In 1891, the Indiana
legislature exempted buildings used for religious worship and "the parsonage
attached thereto and occupied as such" from the property tax. 2 98
In 1859, the Massachusetts consolidated general statutes provided for a tax on all
real and personal property owned by state residents unless exempted by the law. 299
The law provided for a number of exemptions, including "[h]ouses of religious
worship, and the pews and furniture."3"' Any part of exempt houses not used for
religious worship, though, would be subject to the property tax at ordinary property
tax rates.301
Did parsonages fit within the scope of the exemption? Massachusetts courts held
that they did not. Exempting parsonages would certainly "aid in the support of public
worship ... " but the legislature has not undertaken to exempt that which would do
this, but the house of religious worship only." 302 Because the legislature had
explicitly-and only-exempted those parts of houses of religious worship actually
used for religious worship, parsonages did not qualify for the exemption.
In 1938, the Massachusetts legislature amended its exemption. Houses of
religious worship remained exempt to the extent they were used for religious
worship, but the legislature added an exemption "to an amount not exceeding five
thousand dollars for each parsonage."303 Five years after its enactment, the courts
affirmed a religious organization could own more than one parsonage and that the
$5000 exemption applied to each parsonage separately. 3 0 4
In the nineteenth century, Rhode Island law also exempted property used
exclusively for religious purposes. 305 The state supreme court found that parsonages
did not qualify for exemption under this law. 306 Even using one room of the
parsonage for religious worship did not convert the character of the parsonage into a
building used for religious worship. 307 It took until almost halfway through the
twentieth century for Rhode Island to amend its property tax exemption to include

295. Id. at 9.
296. Id.
297. See Oak Hill Cemetery Co. v. Wells, 78 N.E. 350, 351 (Ind. App. 1906).
298. Act of Mar. 6, 1891, ch. XCIX, § 5, 1891 Ind. Acts 199, 200-01.
299. Act of Feb. 3, 1859, tit. III, ch. 11, § 2, 1859 Mass. Acts 227, 227.
300. Id. § 5.
301. Id.
302. Third Congregational Soc'y v. City of Springfield, 18 N.E. 68, 69 (Mass. 1888).
303. Act of May 16, 1938, ch. 317, 1938 Mass. Acts 270, 270. It is worth noting that,
notwithstanding its name, the General Court of Massachusetts is the state legislature. MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, § 1, art. I ("The department of legislation shall be formed by two branches,
. . and shall be stiled [sic], The General Court of Massachusetts.") (emphasis omitted).
304. Assessors of Bos. v. Old S. Soc'y, 50 N.E.2d 51, 52-53 (Mass. 1943).
305. Act of Feb. 1, 1882 tit. VIII, ch. 41, § 2, 1882 R.I. Pub. Laws, 120, 120.
306. St. Joseph's Church v. Assessors of Taxes of Providence, 12 R.I. 19, 20-21 (1878).
307. Id.
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parsonages.30 And when it included parsonages, it limited the exempt value of a
parsonage to $10,000.309
Idaho made a similar legislative change, though the reasons for the change are
unclear. When Idaho became a state, it "carr[ied] over the language of the territorial
statute exempting religious property into the law of the state." 3 10 Similar to many
other states, the territorial (and then state) law exempted "[c]hurches, chapels and
other buildings with the lots or ground appurtenant thereto and used therewith,
belonging to any church organization or society and used for religious worship." 311
No cases explicitly adjudicate the question of whether this exemption included
parsonages, but two things suggest that it did not. First, Idaho courts construe tax
exemptions narrowly and strictly against the taxpayer.3 1 2 The language of the statute
required that exempt buildings be used for religious worship. Residence is not
worship, and other states that dealt with the question held that, where the exemption
statute required religious worship, parsonages did not qualify.
Second, in 1913, Idaho changed its law. 313 While the impetus for the change is
unclear, the result is perfectly clear. Under the 1913 law, the tax exemption applied
not only to buildings owned by religious entities and used for public worship, but
also to "any parsonage belonging to such corporation or society and occupied as
such." 3 14 Whatever the legislature's motivation in doing so, like the other states
discussed in this Section, it explicitly legislated an exemption for parsonages. 3 15

308. Act of Jan. 15, 1947, ch. 1855, 1947 R.I. Pub. Laws 1, 87.

309. Id.
310. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Ada Cnty., 849 P.2d 83, 88 (Idaho 1993).
311. Act of Mar. 7, 1911, ch. 171, sec. 1, § 1644, 1911 Idaho Sess. Laws 565, 566.
312. Corporation of the PresidingBishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 849 P.2d at 88.
313. Id.
314. Act of Mar. 13, 1913, ch. 58, art. I, § 4(B), 1913 Idaho Sess. Laws 173, 175.
315. It is worth noting that even this change did not bring absolute clarity to the question
of the exemption of parsonages. While the legislature clarified that parsonages were exempt
from taxation, it did not clarify what qualified as a parsonage. In 1991, the state supreme court
looked at whether the home of a Mormon mission president qualified as a parsonage for
purposes of the property tax exemption. Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 849 P.2d at 87. In applying its narrow construction, see

supra note 312 and accompanying text, it determined that "parsonage" meant "a residence
occupied by the incumbent minister having ecclesiastical domain over a contained body of
parishioners or church members, formally referred to as a congregation." Id. at 90. Because a
Mormon mission president did not have an affiliated meetinghouse or a local congregation,
and because a Mormon mission president did not function as a minister, the home he lived in
did not qualify as a parsonage for property tax exemption purposes. Id. at 92.
In 2007, the Idaho legislature again updated its property tax exemptions. Under the 2007 law,
instead of exempting parsonages, Idaho exempted property owned by religious societies
"including any and all residences used for or in furtherance of such purposes." Act of Mar. 2,
2007, ch. 38, § 1, 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws 95, 95. The legislature explained that it was replacing
the word "'parsonages,' which has caused much confusion," with the new broader language,
"which properly reflects the types of usages meant to be exempt." H. Res. 16748, 59 Leg., 1st
Sess. (Idaho 2007).
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3. Judicial Change
Two states comprise the third category, in which the exemption of parsonages
occurred through judicial decisions rather than amendments to the state constitution
or state statutes. Like Idaho, in 1895, Oregon's supreme court held that tax
exemptions were strictly construed against the taxpayer, and to claim an exemption,
the legislature's intent to grant it had to be "clear beyond a reasonable doubt." 3 1 6
Although the property in front of the Oregon Supreme Court was not a parsonage,
the court used a parsonage as an example of the type of property that would not
qualify as exempt from taxation.3 17
More than eighty years later, taxpayers seem to have internalized the court's dicta.
In 1976, the Skyline Assembly of God acknowledged that the portion of its property
it used as a parsonage did not qualify for a property tax exemption. 3 18 It argued that
its use of the rest of its property did qualify for exemption, though, because it used
the rest of the property for religious purposes. 319
It took until the following year for the question of whether a parsonage qualified
for tax exemption to land squarely in front of the Oregon court. 3 20 And when the
question landed squarely in front of the court, it chose not to follow its previous dicta
entirely. Instead, it held that if the property owner showed that it needed a parsonage
to accomplish a religious purpose and that because its actual use was to accomplish
religious purposes, a parsonage could qualify as exempt. Parsonages, under Oregon
judicial precedent, do not automatically qualify as exempt. But, the court said, with
1
appropriate needs and uses, they can.3 2
Illinois presents perhaps the most complex case of all of the states whose law
changed to allow the exemption of parsonages. The 1870 state constitution required
that the legislature levy a tax under which "every person and corporation shall pay a
tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property." 322 The constitution allowed,
but did not require, the legislature to exempt from that general property tax property
"used exclusively for ... religious ... purposes." 323 The legislature could only create
these exemptions through general law.3 24
Two years later, the Illinois legislature enacted legislation creating a general
property tax that applied to, among other things, "[a]41 real and personal property in
this state." 3 25 The statute took advantage of the constitutionally permitted

316. Portland Hibernian Benevolent Soc'y v. Kelly, 42 P. 3, 6 (Or. 1895).
317. Id.
318. Skyline Assembly of God v. Dep't of Revenue, 545 P.2d 879, 880 (Or. 1976).
319. Id.
320. German Apostolic Christian Church v. Dep't of Revenue, 569 P.2d 596, 599 (Or.
1977) ("We have not in the past directly ruled on the taxability of a church rectory or
parsonage.").
321. See id. at 600.
322. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 1.
323. Id. § 3.
324. Id.

325. Act of Mar. 30, 1872, ch. 120, § 1, 1872 Ill. Laws 1620, 1624.
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exemptions, removing, among other things, "[a]il property used exclusively for
religious purposes" from the property tax base.3 26
In 1905, the Illinois legislature amended its property tax exemptions, adding
parsonages to the list of property exempt from the property tax.3 27 In 1907, the Cook
County tax collector sued the First Congregational Church of Oak Park for unpaid
property taxes on a two-story home owned by the church and used exclusively by the
pastor and his family as a residence.3 28
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a home used "primarily for a family
residence by the pastor" was not used "exclusively for religious purposes," 329 the
constitutional requirement for a property tax exemption. Moreover, in spite of its
attempt, the court held that the legislature could not "make that a religious purpose
which in fact is not a religious purpose." 330 Because housing clergy did not qualify
as a religious purpose, church-owned parsonages in Illinois were subject to the
property tax.331
Five years later, the court revisited the question of parsonage tax exemptions. The
pastor of the First Congregational Church of DeKalb lived with his family in a
church-owned parsonage.3 3 2 The pastor testified that not only did he and his family
live in the parsonage, but that he also used the parsonage for a number of religious
purposes, including counselling congregants, performing marriages and baptisms,
and sometimes even holding classes and Sunday school.3 3 3
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the parsonage did not qualify for an
exemption from the property tax despite these incidental religious uses. 33 4 Under a
general property tax, it noted, all property is taxable unless exempted from taxation
by the state constitution and statutes consistent with the state constitution. 33 "And in
determining whether property falls within the terms of the exemption, whether it be
constitutional or statutory, it is the primary use to which the property is put which
must be considered and not its secondary use."336
The court found that, in spite of the various incidental uses of the parsonage, its
primary use was housing the pastor and his family.3 3 7 Housing the pastor was a

326. Id. § 2.

327. People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational Church of Oak Park, 83 N.E. 536,
537 (Ill. 1907).
328. Id.

329. Id. at 538.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. First Congregational Church of De Kalb v. Bd. of Review of De Kalb Cnty., 98 N.E.
275, 275 (Ill. 1912).
333. Id.

334. Id. at 277.
335. Id. at 276.
336. Id. (citing People ex rel. Thompson v. First Congregational Church of Oak Park, 83
N.E. 536, 538 (Ill. 1907)).
337. Id. at 276-77.
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secular, not religious, purpose.3 3 8 In 1912, then, parsonages in Illinois continued to
be subject to the state's general property tax. 339
In 1957, the Illinois legislature tried again to exempt parsonages from the property
tax. It amended the Revenue Act of 1939 to exempt

[a]11 property used exclusively for religious purposes, ... including all
such property owned by churches or religious institutions and used in
conjunction therewith as parsonages or other housing facilities provided
for ministers, their spouses, children and domestic employees,
performing the duties of their vocation as ministers at such churches or
religious institutions. 340
Kurt McKenzie, an Illinois taxpayer, challenged the exemption for parsonages as
being unconstitutional under the Illinois Constitution. 341 His argument for its
unconstitutionality roughly followed the Illinois Supreme Court's early twentiethcentury cases: parsonages were used primarily for secular purposes and therefore
were not used exclusively for religious purposes. 34 2
Essentially, McKenzie argued that the Illinois Constitution created a blanket ban
of exempting parsonages because a parsonage's "residential character must
predominate over any other religious uses of the property." 3 4 3 The court disagreed.
It had a long history of reading the exclusivity requirement of property tax exemption
as requiring that a property's primarypurpose be exempt.34 4 Parsonages, it held, were
34 5
no different in this regard.
But the court did highlight a significant difference between McKenzie's case and
the earlier cases denying parsonages a tax exemption. The narrow construction of
primary religious use, it explained, "is out of step with more recent Illinois authority
on tax exemptions, and these cases do not establish that parsonages may never be
used exclusively-that is primarily-for religious purposes." 3 4 6 Under contemporary

338. Id. at 277. It is worth noting, as we explore the convoluted history of the parsonage
property tax exemption, that the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion was not inevitable.
Around the same time, South Dakota's constitution exempted religious property with language
identical to that found in the Illinois Constitution. State ex rel. Eveland v. Erickson, 182 N.W.
315, 318 (S.D. 1921). The South Dakota Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the
dissenters in FirstCongregationalChurch of De Kalb v. Board ofReview ofDe Kalb County,
98 N.E. 275, 278 (Ill. 1912): the exclusivity requirement meant the property was used primarily

for religious purposes, and that housing clergy was a religious purpose. Id. at 319. Thus, with
an identical constitution and a substantially identical fact pattern, the South Dakota Supreme
Court allowed for the exemption of parsonages where the Illinois Supreme Court did not.
339. See FirstCongregationalChurch ofDe Kalb, 98 N.E. at 226.

340. Act of July 13, 1938, § 19, 1938 Ill. Laws 66 (codified as amended at Act of June 13,
1957, sec. 1, § 19, 1957 Ill. Laws 614, 615).
341. McKenzie v. Johnson, 456 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ill. 1983).
342. Id. at 76-77.
343. Id. at 78.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 78-79.
346. Id. at 79.
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standards, the court looks to whether the property "reasonably and substantially
facilitates the aims of religious worship or religious instruction."347
The Illinois Supreme Court emphasized in its McKenzie decision that the
inclusion of parsonages in the statute does not mean parsonages inherently qualify
as exempt. Rather, the inclusion of parsonages in the statute illustrates "one type of
property that, under appropriate circumstances, may qualify for the general religious
property exemption." 3 48 Because the 1957 legislation did not expand the set of
exempt religious property beyond the state constitution-and because judicial
definitions of exclusivity expanded-by 1957, Illinois had shifted from refusing to
exempt parsonages to accepting parsonages as exempt from the property tax under
many circumstances. 3 49
V. THE WRONG HISTORY

While a careful review of the history of property tax exemptions for parsonages
demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit misunderstood the history, even if it had
portrayed the history correctly that history would not lend support to the idea that
income tax exemptions for housing allowances met the historical significance test. A
property tax exemption differs from an income tax exclusion, both substantively and
constitutionally. Moreover, the beneficiary of the income tax exclusion differs from
the beneficiary of the property tax exemption.
The Western District of Wisconsin noticed this distinction between a property and
an income tax. The district court opinion pointed out that the history the intervenors
relied on was the history of church property tax exemptions. 350 The court stated that
it "cannot generalize that all religious tax exemptions are permissible simply because
one type of exemption has historical support."351
The district court raised a critical point. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the
Supreme Court dismissed the need to define "the precise boundary of the
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted." 35 2
The historical significance test requires this specificity precisely because it relies on
the Framers' acceptance of the practice, as well as it subsequently withstanding "the
35 3
critical scrutiny of time and political change."
If the Supreme Court's jurisprudence actually requires the specific practice, even
if states had consistently exempted parsonages from property tax, that would not
reflect on the constitutionality of an income tax exclusion. And, in fact, income tax
exemptions could never pass the historical significance test, since the first time the

347. Id.
348. Id. at 77.
349. See Act of July 13, 1938, § 19, 1938 Ill. Laws 66 (codified as amended at Act of June
13, 1957, sec. 1, § 19, 1957 Ill. Laws 614, 615); McKenzie, 456 N.E.2d at 100.
350. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1102 (W.D. Wis. 2017), rev'd, No. 16CV-215-BBC, 2017 WL 6375819 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2017), rev'd, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir.
2019).
351. Id. at 1103.
352. 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014).
353. Id.
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country implemented a federal income tax was during the Civil War and the second
time was in 1913.354
How does the Seventh Circuit deal with this problem? It denies that there is a
problem, asserting that the difference between property tax and income tax is "too
fine a distinction" to matter.355 And it is too fine a distinction, according to the
Seventh Circuit, precisely because "[b]efore 1913, Congress could not
constitutionally tax housing provided to ministers as part of their income. "356 The
court implicitly acknowledges that the income tax, standing on its own, is not
amenable to a historical significance test, and thus it has to import two centuries of
property tax to force the question to fit within the historical significance test
framework.
This move, while necessary for the court to apply its historical significance test,
does not work. The history, policy, and constitutional considerations surrounding
property taxes differ too much from the same history, policy, and constitutional
considerations that apply to the income tax.
Critically, income taxes and property taxes are not functionally equivalent. Some
differences reflect practical concerns. Property taxation is a subset of wealth
taxation, 35 7 in contrast to income taxation, which is not. Property and income taxation
are "not the same in substance." 358 A property tax is imposed on the assessed value
of the property, and is due whether or not the owner has liquid assets with which to
pay the tax. 35 9 The federal income tax, by contrast, is imposed on net income,
ensuring taxpayers have some degree of liquidity with which to pay the tax. 3 60 In
essence, then, a taxpayer can owe property tax even when she has no income with
which to pay the property tax. By definition, though, she cannot owe income tax
unless she has income.
Popular perception of income and property taxes reflects this difference. Because
of the different bases of the two taxes (income versus assessed value of the property),
they may have "different political optics." 361 And historically, the two have had
different constitutional optics. For instance, in 1969, William Consedine, general
counsel of the U.S. Catholic Conference, argued to the Senate that "fiscal separation"
was fundamental to the separation of church and state. 3 62 According to Consedine,

354. See supra note 11.

355. Gaylorv. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 436 (7th Cir. 2019).
356. Id.
357. Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty in America: A Tale of Two Literatures,
68 TAx L. REV. 453, 489 (2015) ("A conventional wealth tax would be a property tax-albeit,
more broad-based than those generally applied by the states if it included financial wealth.").
358. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 932 (2009).
359. See Stewart E. Sterk & Mitchell L. Engler, Property Tax Reassessment: Who Needs

It?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1037, 1045 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Once and Future
Property Tax: A Dialogue with My Younger Self, 23 CARDOzO L. REv. 2199, 2201-02 (2002).
360. See David A. Weisbach, The (Non)taxation of Risk, 58 TAx L. REv. 1, 36 (2004)
("Income tax advocates would prefer a Haig-Simons system but because of liquidity,
valuation, or other problems, we have a realization system.").
361. Bankman et al., supra note 357, at 488.
362.

BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., TAx REFORM-1969: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TAX

REFORM ACT OF 1969 (PUBLIC LAW 91-172) WITH RELATED AMENDMENTS 4435 (1991).
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that fiscal separation did not mean that religion was exempt from tax. In fact,
"[w]here the tax is imposed on property and not directly on religious activities,
Government has wide discretion under our Constitution to impose or not to impose
the tax." 3 63

These different constitutional optics may reflect actual constitutional differences.
While the courts recognize property taxes as direct taxes subject to constitutionally
mandated apportionment,364 the Sixteenth Amendment expressly permits Congress
to impose income taxes without apportioning them. 36 5 Moreover, an emerging
(though not universal) consensus believes that the Supreme Court overreached in its
Pollock decision, which found the income tax unconstitutional. 3 66 If this consensus
is right, the Sixteenth Amendment was superfluous because, unlike taxes on real
property, taxes on income do not fall within the scope of direct taxes.
Given these structural and constitutional differences, there is no plausible
justification for the Seventh Circuit's assertion that differences between income and
property taxes were "too fine" to have constitutional relevance. 367 Even assuming
that there were justifications for using the history of property tax exemptions to
explore the constitutionality of an income tax exclusion, though, state property tax
exemptions for religiously owned property provide no information about what the
Framers thought of the permissibility of these exemptions.
The court was correct that the Framers could not have considered the
constitutionality of exempting ministers from an income tax on housing allowances
when they wrote the Constitution, because the United States would not enact a
federal income tax for nearly seventy-five years after they enacted the Constitution.
But they were also not thinking about the constitutionality of exempting church
property from a property tax. In fact, they most likely did not consider the contours
of a property tax at all.
The Constitution gave Congress the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises." 3 68 It limited that power, though, with respect to direct taxes.
Under the Constitution, "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." 3 69 This
apportionment of direct taxes, along with determining representation in the House,
was part of the Three-Fifths Compromise that inserted inequality directly into the
Constitution and bridged a divide between northern and southern states. 370

363. Id.
364. See supra notes 35842 and accompanying text.

365. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
366. Johnsen et al., supra note 129, at 114, 119 ("Furthermore, most (but not all)

commentators are extremely critical of the Court's decision in Pollock, recognize the practical
impossibility in modern times of apportioning just about any plausible tax, and endorse some
narrow construction of this limitation on Congress's otherwise-broad constitutional
authority.").

367. Gaylorv. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 436 (7th Cir. 2019).
368. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
369. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
370.

ROBIN L. EmHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY

165-66

(2006).
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The problem with this bridge was that nobody knew precisely what constituted a
direct tax.371 Whatever the scope of a direct tax was, though, there was broad
consensus that it included taxes on real property. Alexander Hamilton believed that
indirect taxes were made up largely of "duties and excises on articles of
consumption," while direct taxes included taxes on real property. 372 And in 1796, a
majority of the Supreme Court wrote in their opinions in Hylton that direct taxes
included taxes on land. 373
Effectively, requiring Congress to apportion direct taxes meant that Congress
would generally not impose direct taxes. Apportioning a tax on real property would
require each state to pay the percentage of the tax that corresponded to the percentage
of the country's population that lived in the state. More populous states would face
a higher tax burden, irrespective of the value of the land in the state. 3 74
The apportionment requirement did not make a federal property tax impossible. It
did ensure its unlikeliness, though. The Framers expected that Congress would enact
direct taxes rarely, if at all. 3 75 In fact, the federal government only enacted direct
taxes four times: "once in 1798, twice during the War of 1812, and once during the

Civil War." 3 76
In crafting these federal property taxes, the federal government had to comply
with the Establishment Clause. 3 7 7 For the first 150 years of the Constitution, though,
the courts gave virtually no guidance as to what such compliance looked like. 3 78
Similarly, these federal property taxes provide no information about the Framers'
thoughts on exemptions for religiously owned property generally, or for parsonages
in particular. Each of the statutes provides for a direct tax on, among other things, all
lands, dwelling-houses, and enslaved persons located within a state.379 These direct
taxes provided exemptions for property owned by the United States, by the states,
and for property exempted under the law of the respective state. 380 States, in turn,
had not yet implemented universal property taxes. As a result, their property tax
exemptions were ad hoc and largely carried over from their colonial history. 381

371. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1999)
("Within this context, the fact that the nature of 'direct' taxation was lost in a haze of
uncertainty was not a vice-it helped the contending parties to patch together a verbally
attractive compromise, and to turn their attention to more profitable subjects of
conversation.").
372. THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
373. Hyltonv. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175-76, 183 (1796).
374. Cf Samuel D. Brunson, Payingfor Gun Violence, 104 MINN. L. REv. 605, 628 (2019)
(describing hypothetical example of an unfair apportioned direct tax).
375. EINHORN, supra note 370, at 165.
376. Id. at 158.
377. Zelmanv. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The
Establishment Clause originally protected States, and by extension their citizens, from the
imposition of an established religion by the Federal Government.").
378. BRUNSON, supra note 23, at 14.
379. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 75, § 2, 1 Stat. 597, 598; Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 16, § 5, 3
Stat. 22, 26; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, § 5, 3 Stat. 164, 166; Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45,
§ 13, 12 Stat. 292, 297.
380. § 2, 1 Stat. at 598; § 5, 3 Stat. at 26; § 5, 3 Stat. at 166; § 13, 12 Stat. at 297.
381. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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If federal property tax does nothing to help us understand how the Framers viewed
the constitutionality of property tax exemptions for parsonages, looking at state-level
property tax exemptions does little more. In the first instance, the Establishment
Clause applied only to the federal government, and created no impediment to states
favoring religion if they so chose.38 2 In the second, state legislatures did not initially
approach property taxes systemically. 383 When they finally did, they evinced
significant skepticism about exemptions from the property tax, and even when
legislatures permitted exemptions for religious property, they crafted those
exemptions narrowly, often in ways that excluded parsonages.3"
Finally, and most importantly, even if the history of federal or state property tax
exemptions provided any insight into the Framers' views-as the historical
significance test mandates 38 5-that history proves utterly irrelevant to the question
the Seventh Circuit addressed. The question before the court was not about the
constitutionality of providing tax-free housing to clergy. While the taxpayers
originally challenged the constitutionality of this in kind allowance, the district court
dismissed that portion of the challenge, and the taxpayers did not appeal its
dismissal.38 6 The only question in front of the court was whether the Constitution
allowed the government to exclude cash housing allowances paid to clergy from the
clergy's income. 387
Naturally, clergy did not-and do not-pay property tax on their income. Neither
do other taxpayers. By definition, a property tax does not apply to taxpayers'
income-its base is the assessed value of the taxpayers' property, not their income. 388
As a result, state property tax laws could not reach housing allowances.
Moreover, even if a court were to stretch analogy beyond the breaking point,
property tax exemptions provide no support for excluding cash allowances that allow
clergy to rent or buy their own homes. In every state that permits an explicit
exemption for parsonages, the law requires that the parsonage be owned by a
religious organization, not by individual clergy. 389 Similarly, in other states without
an explicit exemption for parsonages, only religiously owned property can qualify
for the exemption.3 90

See supra notes 135 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
382.

385. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

386. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 2019).
387. See id. at 424-25 ("In response, Gaylor and Barker filed amended tax returns for 2012
and 2013 claiming refunds for their housing allowances under § 107(2); Nicol Gaylor did the
same for 2013.").

388. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Challenge of Inclusion, 89 TEMP. L. REv. 487, 498 (2017)
("[T]he local property tax base ... is determined by the assessed value of homes in the
community.").
389. See supra Section IV.Al.
390. See supra Section IV.A.2-3. New York State provides the one exception to this rule;
in New York, clergy can exclude up to $1500 of property annually from the property tax. N.Y.
REAL PRoP. TAx § 460(1) (McKinney 2017). Even this exception to the general rule provides
no support for the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance-the exemption, whether or
not constitutional, is both insufficient to substantively cover housing costs and it applies
broadly to all taxable property, irrespective of type or use.
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Ultimately, then, even if the history of state property tax exemptions for
parsonages provided a clean and consistent history, that history would have nothing
to say about whether an income tax exclusion for housing allowances paid to clergy
comported with the Establishment Clause. Income taxes and property taxes differ
substantively and constitutionally. Beyond that difference, because the
Establishment Clause did not apply to states, their property taxes and exemptions did
not have to comply with constitutional limitations on the establishment of religion.
And on those rare occasions when the federal government looked to direct taxation,
it ignored questions of religious property altogether, instead adopting whatever
exemptions the various states recognized.
CONCLUSION

An in-depth look at the history of state property tax exemptions for parsonages is
illuminating. It demonstrates shifts in state policy underlying both property taxes and
exemptions from property tax. This history shows that exempting parsonages is not
an inevitable policy choice, and even when a state exempts parsonages, the state often
imposes limits on that exemption. Those limits range from all states limiting the
exemption to parsonages owned by religious organizations to some states limiting
the acreage, value, or number of exempt parsonages.
This historical analysis does not illuminate that the parsonage allowance is
consonant with the Establishment Clause. Admittedly, the history also does not show
that the parsonage allowance violates the Establishment Clause. However, the federal
government has rarely enacted property taxes, and the Establishment Clause was
incorporated against the states relatively recently. As a result, the question of
establishment was not one that states generally grappled with. Instead, the
constitutional question many states had to deal with was whether parsonages met the
state constitution's requirement for a religious tax exemption, which often turned on
whether housing clergy qualified as a religious purpose. This is an important
question, but one with no relevance to whether the federal exclusion of housing
allowances to clergy violates the Establishment Clause.
Even if the history of property tax exemptions provided a clear case for or against
the constitutionality of the federal parsonage allowance, though, this Article
demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit's use of that history in Gaylor was deeply
deficient. The Seventh Circuit asserted-inaccurately-an unbroken, consistent
history of exemptions for religious property and used that history to assume a
similarly unbroken history of exemptions for parsonages.
The consistent history the Seventh Circuit asserted is entirely imaginary. The
policy for exempting religious property from the property tax has shifted
substantially over the last two centuries and was controversial even in its earliest
days. In fact, both California and the District of Columbia had periods during the
nineteenth century when they did not exempt religious property.
And history demonstrates that the exemption for religious property has always
been narrower than all property owned by a religious organization. All states have
required that exempt property be owned by the religious organization, and most
states have required that it either be used for religious purposes (or, in some cases,
worship) or otherwise be explicitly listed to qualify for an exemption from the
property tax.
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The Seventh Circuit elided all of this complexity and inconsistency in the one
page of its opinion it dedicated to evaluating the history of property tax exemptions
for parsonages.3 91 Instead, it posited a clean, orderly, consistent history, with "a
lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for religion, particularly for church-owned
properties." 3 9 2 While the purported history the Gaylor court relied on was clean and
easy to understand, this Article has demonstrated both that there is no singular
lengthy tradition of tax exemptions for religion, and that even if there were, "churchowned properties" is far too broad a category. Moreover, its opinion entirely missed
the fragility of property tax exemptions for parsonages.
The problem here is not merely a deficient Seventh Circuit opinion, though that
is a problem. In general, this Article should give pause to the idea that a historical
significance test is a viable test for Establishment Clause questions. A historical
argument is not a legal argument, and there is no reason to believe that attorneys or
judges have the skills necessary to make or adjudicate a historical argument well. 393
Gathering and reviewing the history of a law that may privilege religion is a long and
complicated undertaking. It is both interesting and important but may be an
undertaking better left to the academy than to judicial proceedings. If courts truly
want to use a historical significance test, they need to engage fully with the history,
not use a subset of the history as a justification to arrive at the result they want.
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess. But adding
a poorly conceived and poorly done historical analysis to the mix of jurisprudential
tools does little to clarify and improve the Establishment Clause landscape. As the
Seventh Circuit's Gaylor opinion and this Article demonstrate, unless courts are
willing to put in an inordinate amount of work and analysis, they should avoid the
historical significance test, and instead use tools better fit to legal analysis.

391. See Gaylorv. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 436 (7th Cir. 2019).
392. Id.

393. Judges and attorneys do make historical arguments, of course. But should they? "An
obvious objection is that judges (and presumably lawyers) are poor historians." Jonathan C.
Lipson& Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, Stern, Seriously: The Article I JudicialPower, Fraudulent
Transfers, and Leveraged Buyouts, 2013 Wis. L. REV. 1161, 1223 (2013). This is not

necessarily an indictment of judges and attorneys: while legal scholarship and historical
scholarship share similar ancestral roots, "their professional paths have long since diverged in
many ways." Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre,

144 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 524 (1995). More cynically, Judge Richard A. Posner wrote that "[t]he
legal profession's use of history is a disguise that allows the profession to innovate without
breaching judicial etiquette, which deplores both novelty and a frank acknowledgement of
judicial discretion and likes to pretend that decisions by nonelected judges can be legitimated
by being shown to have democratic roots in some past legislative or constitutional enactment."
Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication
and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 581 (2000).
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1: STATES WITH EXPRESS STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FOR PARSONAGES

State

Statutory Exemption

Alaska

§ 29.45.030(b) (2018)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-3-206 (2020)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-81(15) (West 2019)
D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1002(15) (2015)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.011(b)(3) (West 2014)

Arkansas
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia

ALASKA STAT. ANN.

GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-41(a)(3) (2017)
COUNTY OF MAUI, HAW., CODE OF ORDINANCES

§3.48.495(B)(3) (1980);
COUNTY OF HAW., HAW., CODE

Hawaii

§ 19-77(b)(3) (2016, as amended);
COUNTY OF HONOLULU, HAw., REV. ORDINANCES

Idaho

§ 8-10.10(b)(3) (1990);
KAUA'I, HAW., CODE tit. III,
§ 5A-11.10(b)(3) (1987).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-602B (West 2017)

Illinois

35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/15-40(b) (2016)

COUNTY OF

Indiana
Kansas
Maine
Maryland

§ 6-1.1-10-21(b), (c) (West 2013)
§ 79-201 (West 2018)
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 36, § 652(1)(G) (2010)

IND. CODE

KAN. STAT. ANN.

MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 7-204(2) (LexisNexis 2018)

§ 5 (West 2010)
§ 211.7s (West 2010)

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59,

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 27-31-1(d) (West 2012)
§ 15-6-201(1)(b) (2019)

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN.

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

§ 361.125(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2016)
§ 72:23(III) (2012)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017)
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw § 462 (McKinney 2017)
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-278.3(d)(1) (West 2018)
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 57-02-08(9)(a) (2018)
44 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-3-3(a)(6) (2010)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-37-220(A)(3) (Supp. 2019)
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20 (West 2015)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3832(2) (Supp. 2019)
VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3606(A)(2) (2017)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.36.020(2)(a) (West 2018)
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-3-9(a)(6) (LexisNexis 2020)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 70.11(4) (West 2016)
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-11-105(a)(vii)(A) (2019)

NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.

N.H. REv. STAT.
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APPENDIX 2: NON-STATUTORILY-RECOGNIZED EXEMPTION FOR PARSONAGES

State

General Religious

Exemption

Judicial Application to Parsonages
St. Stanislaus Kostka Church
v. Mayor of Wilmington,

Delaware

Iowa

Del. Code. Ann.
tit. 9, § 8105 (2011)

105 A.2d 596, 599 (Del. Super. Ct. 1954),
affd sub nom.
Mayor of Wilmington
v. St. Stanislaus Kostka Church,
108 A.2d 581 (1954)

Iowa Code Ann.
§ 427.1(8)(a)
(West 2020)

Trinity Lutheran Church of Des Moines
v. Browner,
255 Iowa 197, 200-01 (1963)

Louisiana

La. Const.,
art. VII, § 21(B)(1)(a)(i)

Minnesota

Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 272.02 subd. 6
(West 2017)

In re Collection of Delinquent Real Prop.
Taxes,
530 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Minn. 1995)

Missouri

Mo. Const.
art. X, § 6(1)

Bishop's Residence Co. v. Hudson,
4 S.W. 435, 435 (1887)

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 77-202(1)(d)
(LexisNexis 2017)

Neb. Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church
v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Bd. of Equalization,
499 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1993)

New
Mexico

N.M. Const.
art. VIII, § 3

N.M. Admin. Code 3.6.5.15(L)(2)
(as amended in 2001)

Oklahoma

Okla. Const.
art. X, § 6

Immanuel Baptist Church v. Glass,
497 P.2d 757, 760 (Okla. 1972)

S.D. Codified Laws
§ 10-4-9 (Supp. 2020)

State v. Erickson,
182 N.W. 315, 319 (S.D. 1921)

South
Dakota
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APPENDIX 3: PARSONAGE EXEMPTION DEPENDS ON USE

State

California

Oregon

General Religious
Exemption

Conditions for Application to
Parsonages

CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE
§ 214(a)
(West 2011)

First United Methodist Church of Santa
Monica
v. Los Angeles Cnty.,
161 Cal. App. 3d 1091, 208 Cal. Rptr. 85,
93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)

OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 307.140(1) (2017)

Washington Cnty. Assessor
v. W. Beaverton Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc.,
18 Or. Tax 409, 417-18 (2006)
Blackwood Bros. Evangelistic Ass'n

TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5212(a)(1) (2018)

Tennessee

v. State Bd. of Equalization,
614 S.W.2d 364, 366
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)

APPENDIX 4: NO PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR PARSONAGES

State

General Religious

__________

Ohio

Pennsylvania

Utah

Exemption

Denial of Application to Parsonages

__________________

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5709.07(A)(2)-(3)
(LexisNexis 2019)

Grace Cathedral, Inc. v. Testa,
36 N.E.3d 136, 141 (Ohio 2015)

72 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 5020-204(a)(1)
(West 2013)

Connellsville Street Church of Christ
v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals,
838 A.2d 848, 853 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)

UTAH CONST.

art. XIII, § 3(1)(f)

Salt Lake Cty. v. Tax Comm'n
ex rel. Good Shepherd Lutheran Church,
548 P.2d 630, 631 (Utah 1976)

APPENDIX 5: NO JUDICIAL GUIDANCE ON TREATMENT OF PARSONAGES

State
Alabama

General Religious Property Tax
Exemption
ALA. CODE

§ 40-9-1(1)(LexisNexis

2011)

.o
Arizona

ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-11109(A) (2018)

Colorado

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-3-106 (West 2019)

Kentucky

KY. CONST. § 170

